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Abstract 
Security as a profession and discipline has emerged principally in the later half of the 
twentieth century and has developed to become a more defined, usual, respectable 
and visual part of management. This study aimed to determine the degree of 
recognition and application of security risk management to corporate governance 
practices in Australia. 
Formal research design used descriptive research methodology, consisting of a 
literature review, primary document analysis and a questionnaire survey to collect 
data. This research was contrasted to a Corporate Governance Security Model 
formulated to determine if the model is applicable to the recognition, or application, 
of a security function to the Australian Stock Exchange ('ASX') Corporate 
Governance principles. 
A major finding of this study is that security functions and responsibilities are poorly 
recognised and documented by Australia's largest public company boards. A 
majority of directors will have no experience or qualifications in security risk 
management and this is likely to be reflected down through the organisation resulting 
in low to medium security awareness and culture. 
Corporate governance statements from companies listed on the ASX/S&P 200 
strongly suggests that security related risks are not widely considered as part of the 
corporate governance framework. With limited application of security in the corporate 
governance framework, there is less focus on security related behaviour within the 
codes of conduct held by a majority of public companies. This can have an adverse 
impact on corporate ethics, internal controls and crisis response capabilities. 
The study developed a model which implements security risk management functions 
to the corporate governance framework in order to formally recognise and promote 
effective management of security risk and compliance. Applying security as a 
business process to support long term revenue was found to benefit corporate 
reputation and compliments other risk and business management practices. Security 
of information and confidentiality is enhanced to encourage reports of misconduct 
within the company, generating a security and reporting culture. 
Security functions are currently limited to form part of internal controls within the 
operating environment and generally viewed as a cost centre which does not 
contribute to revenue. Security functions are not holistically applied across the 
organisation or within the corporate governance framework. 
There are a number of recommendations resulting from the study and are primarily 
concerned with the continued need for research into the application and recognition 
of security within the hierarchy of executive and business management. 
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Definition of Terms 
Awareness 
Board of Directors 
Corporate Governance 
Critical Infrastructure 
A measure of knowledge of existence, 
including recognition and recall of key 
features or positioning. 
Director Group with ultimate 
responsibility for managing a company 
and determines strategy and sets 
policies and expectations for 
implementation. 
Non-prescriptive, self-regulatory 
principles and practices to protect 
stakeholder interests and promote 
improved long term 
performance. 
Physical facilities, supply 
technologies 
company 
chains, 
and information 
communication networks that, if 
destroyed, degraded or rendered 
unavailable for an extended period, 
vi 
Culture 
Risk 
Risk Management 
Security 
Security Function 
would significantly impact on social or 
economic well-being. 
A system of shared values, 
assumptions, and norms which unite 
and influence behaviour. 
The chance of an occurrence which will 
impact upon an activity or objective. 
Involves managing risk to achieve an 
appropriate balan·ce between realising 
opportunities for gains while minimising 
losses. 
An implied stable and predictable 
environment without disruption, harm or 
fear of destruction or injury. 
The process and systems in place to 
stabilise an environment and protect 
against disruption, harm and fear of 
disruption or injury. 
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Security Environment 
Terrorism 
The measure of the environment's 
stability and predictability resulting from 
the security function. 
Premeditated, politically or ideologically 
motivated violence perpetrated against 
public targets by groups or agents, 
intended to harm and influence. 
viii 
ABSTRACT 
DECLARATION 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES 
LIST OF TABLES 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
PURPOSE OF STUDY 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Table of Contents 
Ill 
IV 
v 
VI 
IX 
XII 
XIII 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
6 
CORPORATE THEORY 6 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8 
Failures in Corporate Governance...................................................................... 10 
ROLE OF THE BOARD 13 
THE SECURITY FUNCTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 22 
Position of security in the organisational hierarchy ............................................. 22 
Security Risk Management ................................................................................. 28 
Crisis and disaster recovery planning ................................................................. 42 
Security culture ................................................................................................... 50 
Codes of Conduct ............................................................................................... 57 
Communicating security ..................................................................................... 59 
ix 
CHAPTER 3 
THE STUDY 
62 
62 
STUDY PROCEDURE 62 
Design ................................................................................................................ 63 
SAMPLES AND SUBJECT SELECTION 65 
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 66 
RESEARCHINSTRUMENTS 67 
Questionnaire ..................................................................................................... 67 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SECURITY MODEL 70 
PILOT STUDY 70 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 71 
LIMITATIONS 72 
CHAPTER 4 
STUDY RESULTS 
STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS FROM DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 
CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
CHAPTER 6 
STUDY OUTCOMES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
74 
74 
76 
81 
81 
86 
86 
91 
91 
91 
94 
97 
97 
X 
REFERENCES 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
100 
107 
ANNEXURE 1 -APPROACH TO QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENT 109 
ANNEXURE 2- STUDY INTRODUCTION WEBSITE & QUESTIONNAIRE 110 
ANNEXURE 3- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SECURITY MODEL 116 
ANNEXURE 4- DOCUMENT ANALYSIS OF ASX LISTED COMPANIES 119 
xi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Risk management's ability to generate profit. 39 
Figure 2: Levels of security communication. 60 
Figure 3: Sector Profile of Target Population. 75 
Figure 4: Target Population's disclosure of a 76 
Risk Management Committee. 
Figure 5: Percentage of corporate governance 77 
policies concerning environmental risk. 
Figure 6: Percentage of corporate governance 77 
policies concerning occupational health and safety risk. 
Figure 7: Percentage of corporate governance policies 78 
concerning asset protection. 
Figure 8: , Percentage of corporate governance policies 79 
concerning a security function. 
Figure 9: Percentage of corporate governance policies 80 
concerning reporting policy. 
xii 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Document Types examined. 74 
Table 2: Sector Profile of Target Population. 74 
Table 3: Sector Profile of Target Population completing 81 
questionnaire. 
Table 4: Responses to Questionnaire Part 1. 82 
Table 5: Responses to Questionnaire Part 2. 83 
Table 6: Responses to Questionnaire Part 3. 84 
Table 7: Responses to Questionnaire Part 4. 85 
xiii 
·CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Background 
HIH has been central to the whole corporate governance debate as a 
glaring example of what can go wrong when a company makes it 
look as though it has good governance, when in fact it has almost 
none (Main, 2003, p. 269). 
Australia has had some prominent corporate crises in recent years, including 
HIH, One.Tel, Harris Scarfe, Ansett and Pan Pharmaceuticals (Ferguson, 2003, 
p. 40). In 2001-02 the number of complaints to the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission ('ASIC') concerning corporate governance and 
administration grew 12.8% from the public and 42% from external administrators, 
who include auditors, liquidators and receivers (Ferguson, 2003, p. 35). Serious 
complaints include the leaking of information from confidential board meetings. 
An example is an information leak to the Sydney Morning Herald within hours of 
a NAMA Board meeting in 2002. ASIC referred the matter back to the company 
highlighting that they considered the complaint to be an internal corporate 
governance matter. The leak is estimated to have cost NRMA members up to $5 
million (Ferguson, 2003, p. 5}. 
In light of these Australian cases, as well as cases in the United States ("U.S.") 
and United Kingdom, corporate governance has become a major corporate 
issue. New legislation has been introduced in Australia aimed at tightening 
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company disclosures on executive remuneration and increasing penalties for 
continued breaches of disclosure obligations. Stephen Matthews, the Australian 
Shareholders Association deputy chairman asserts that "Boards and their CEO's 
have a long way to go to restore shareholder faith and trust" (Elliott, 2003, p. 33). 
The United States have also introduced new legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 which requires extra oversight of auditing processes, elimination of conflicts 
of interest and greater corporate transparency (Mills, 2003, p. 1 ). 
Furthermore, in response to international terrorism events, the Australian 
Government is calling on businesses who are owners or operators of critical 
infrastructure to begin exchanging key data on their threats, vulnerabilities and 
business continuity planning (Dearne, 2003). 
It is the determination of individual businesses and organisations to take 
responsibility for their own corporate governance and infrastructure protection 
(Dearne, 2003). As new global and business risks emerge, new approaches are 
required to identify and treat those risks. 
Security as a profession and discipline has emerged principally in the later half of 
the twentieth century and has developed to become a more defined, usual, 
respectable and visual part of management (McCrie, 2001, p. 15). In comparison 
with the boom of Information Technology (IT) in the late 1990's and early this 
century, global terrorism, electronic crime and corporate collapses appear to be 
supporting a similar demand in the security and risk management sector. 
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Significance of the study 
This study is significant and well timed as corporate governance and security are 
two of the major issues concerning the corporate world today. The two issues are 
brought together in this study. 
Corporate security directors or managers should have a sound understanding of 
corporate governance principles to ensure the security function is integrated into 
the corporate governance framework. Primarily, corporate security should be 
ingrained into the company's risk management and preferably there should be a 
seat for the security champion on all risk management committees. 
The significance of this study is based upon its implications to current corporate 
governance and security risk management practices in Australia and overseas. 
Should the study confirm security's enhancement of the corporate governance 
framework, and a model with which it can be implemented, it will provide new 
approaches to current corporate governance policy, and promote security as a 
valued business practice at executive management and board level. 
The study will also generate more interest in security management research and 
education, particularly in its application to business leadership and executive 
management. This will contribute to the continued growth and acceptance of the 
security profession. 
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Purpose of Study 
Thematic research priorities for the protection of the built environment, including 
critical infrastructure, proposed by Yates (2004, p. 1 0), state that challenges 
related to business awareness of the changed security environment and risk 
management include; 
a) A failure to integrate security considerations into governance frameworks; 
b) Lack of business awareness that sound business risk management, 
security and resilience can be a long term revenue enhancer; 
c) Lack of benchmarks and metrics for effective security investment; 
d) Lack of integration of security into the issues of consideration for all 
professionals and managers; 
e) Lack of risk management and security risk experience in business; and 
f) Lack of modeling tools and validation models. 
This study, in line with Yates' research priorities, researches security's role in 
corporate gevernance and endorses the progression of security as a profession. 
The study presents a Corporate Governance Security Model to which a security 
function can be recognised or integrated in the current corporate governance and 
risk management framework recommended by the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (2003). The study proposes security guidelines, which are applicable to 
the governance of public and private companies. 
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By demonstrating that sect,Jrity risk management enhances corporate 
governance, this study supports the security function as a viable and necessary 
business framework that contributes to core business and profit generation. The 
Corporate Governance Security Model promotes best practice security 
management and supports security as a necessary contributor in corporate 
assessment, particularly risk management, auditing and business continuity. 
Research Question 
Refer to Annexure 3: Corporate Governance Security Model 
1. Does the Corporate Governance Security Model recognise an existing 
security function in current corporate governance practices? 
2. Does the security function proposed by the Corporate Governance 
Security Model enhance current corporate governance practices? 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Corporate Theory 
According to Dine (2000, p. 3) theories of company existence are all important in 
the understanding of the appropriate corporate governance model. Three 
theories which have been influential in shaping models of companies are; 
contractual, communitaire and the concessionary theories. "The contractual and 
communitaire theories represent two extremes since they reflect notions of the 
company as a product of laissez-faire individualism and 'as an instrument of the 
state, respectively." Concession theory is considered the middle ground. 
Concession theory accepts the state's role of ensuring corporate governance 
structures are fair and democratic, and the notion that the company should 
realign itselfto reflect the social aspirations of the state would be opposed. In its 
simplest form, concession theory views the existence and operation of the 
company as a concession by the state, which grants the ability to trade using the 
corporate tool (Dang, 2000, p. 21 ). 
Bottomley (cited by Dang, 2000, p. 23) proposes the term 'corporate 
constitutionalism' which is the acceptance that the state has a legitimate role in 
regulating corporate governance. Corporate constitutionalism has three key 
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features; "the idea of dual decision-making, which recognises the different roles 
of the board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders in corporate 
life; the idea of deliberative decision-making, which seeks to ensure that 
corporate decisions are made on the basis of an open and genuine consideration 
of all relevant issues; and the idea of a separation of power, which aims to make 
corporate decision-making power diffuse and accountable." 
It is through pricing decisions which providers of funds signal their assessment of 
the quality of governance, which should in turn provide an incentive to the 
owners of the enterprise to alter the quality of governance (Jain, 2000, p. 231 ). In 
efficient market theory (Kaen, 2000), corporate problems will be solved and 
company officers would act in a manner consistent with the interests of all 
stakeholders. Long term consequences will be priced at an appropriate discount 
and result in the flow of funds through investment. In an efficient market, financial 
crisis is more likely to happen due to unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. 
However, the reality is a highly competitive international market, which is unlikely 
to exhibit all the traits of efficiency, all of the time. Competition for funds can lead 
to behaviours by company officers that challenge a fair market, and result in 
activities which ignore long term consequences, considering only the short term 
horizon. In what appears rational from the respective of the individual director, 
may end up as appearing irrational for the market as a whole (Jain, 2000, p. 
234). 
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Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is an established global issue, and whilst it differs 
between markets internationally, on matters of principle they are converging. 
Dunlop (2001, p. 45) asserts that recent literature is focusing "on the need for the 
adoption of non-prescriptive self-regulatory governance principles to promote 
improved performance, unlike earlier material which emphasized prescriptive, 
regulatory solutions. Governance has moved from a 'trust me' to a 'show me' 
environment." 
Corporate governance essentially exists due to the separation of ownership and 
control, due to the interests of those who maintain control over the corporation 
differ from the interests of the members and those who supply it with external 
finance. Corporate governance is the method of reconciliation between the two to 
ensure that businesses are run in the interests of all stakeholders, but particularly 
the shareholders (Png, 2001, p. 156). 
Corporate governance encompasses the relationships and patterns of behaviour 
between different agents in a limited liability corporation. It refers to the rules and 
practices which frame the interactions between the corporate managers, 
shareholders, employees, creditors, key customers and communities (Burgeat, 
2001, p. 3; Kaen, 2000, p. 247). 
Corporate governance is the creation and implementation of processes which 
seek to optimise the return to shareholders whilst satisfying the legitimate 
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expectations of stakeholders. lt. presupposes that the board, and therefore the 
company, will act consistently within a declared set of values against which its 
actions can be judged (Cassidy, 2003, p. 34). 
Dunlop (2001, p. 4 7) proposes a need for a dynamic governance model with four 
main requirements being 'building trust, 'earning freedom from excessive 
regulation', 'investor performance' and 'flexibility in governance'. There is no 
proof that any one model results in optimum performance and it needs to be 
recognised that an appropriate governance model will vary between companies, 
and over time, for the individual company (Dunlop, 2001; Bosch, 1995). 
According to Bosch (1995, p. 65) it is argued that increased international 
competition from Japan, Europe and newly industrialised Asian economies, 
caused pressure on U.S. companies to improve corporate governance to 
strengthen their international competitiveness. 
Good corporate governance is a key to establishing a robust and 
competitive corporate sector, which serves as a source of economic growth 
(Burgeat, 2001, p. 3). 
Corporate governance is an important element in a company's contribution to 
international competitiveness. Whilst minimum international standards must be 
met, Australia should be using corporate governance performance to gain a 
global competitive advantage. "Rather than slavishly following international 
practice, we should be seeking governance innovations to this end (Dunlop, 
2001' p. 48)." 
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Corporate governance in Australi_a has adopted and learned from the experience 
of other countries and in turn has served as a model for other countries. Bosch 
(2001, p. 5) asserts that there is a "wide gap between the maximum possible and 
the minimum excusable, and the whole spectrum is observable in Australian 
corporate governance ... There are many directors who regard board membership 
as more a matter of prestige and social intercourse than of serious duty." 
Failures in Corporate Governance 
The first well documented failure in governance was the South Sea Bubble in 
England in the 181h century. In 1929, the stock market crash resulted in the U.S. 
reforming securities regulation that led to federal legislation in 1933 and 1934. 
Recent events in the 1980's and 1990's, such as the collapse of Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International, Barings Bank and the economic crisis of South 
East Asia and Russia, resulted in a call for greater governance and supervision. 
These major incidents were often the result of incompetence, fraud and abuse 
(Png, 2001, p. 155}. 
Poor corporate governance was identified as one of the root causes of the recent 
Asian financial crisis (Burgeat, 2001, p.3; Jain, 2000, p. 232}. Nam, Kang and 
Kim (2001, p. 85) found that illegal practices of breach of trust, expropriations 
and embezzlement, and company theft appear to continue in many East Asian 
countries, but the punishment of such abuses remains largely weak. 
10 
Ellett (2000, p. 173) suggested that Australia has a very weak system of ensuring 
companies are adopting best practice in corporate governance. The Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) regulates corporate governance practices via the Listing 
Rule 4.1 0.3. These rules state that the company must make a statement of the 
main corporate governance practices that it has in place during the reporting 
period. There is no mandatory compliance with any specified benchmarks. 
The ten (10) essential corporate governance principles recommended by the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (2001, p. 14) are; 
Principle 1 - Lay solid foundations for management and oversight; 
Principle 2 - Structure the board to add value; 
Principle 3 - Promote ethical and responsible decision-making; 
Principle 4 - Safeguard integrity in financial reporting; 
Principle 5 - Make timely and balanced disclosure; 
Principle 6 - Respect the rights of shareholders; 
Principle 7 - Recognise and manage risk; 
Principle 8 - Encourage enhanced performance; 
Principle 9 - Remunerate fairly and responsibly; and 
Principle 10 - Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders. 
Sarre (2001, p.299) confirms that whilst most corporations voluntarily comply, 
there remains concern over the failure of Australian companies to meet 
international standards of best practice. There is evidence of a lack of conformity 
and uniformity, and the suggestion that the ASX requirements are simply used as 
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a means of maintaining legitimacy and control, not necessarily to allay 
stakeholders' concerns. Hiliary (cited by Sarre, 2001, p. 300) asserts "that many 
entities view the rules as a means of avoiding the threat of litigation, and overlook 
the broader accountability objective of satisfying the need for public disclosure in 
order to promote stakeholder confidence." 
Confidence in corporate governance can first be enhanced by the disclosure of 
the role, responsibilities and methods of appointment of the board of directors, 
second, the responsibility for the strategic direction, day-to-day management and 
internal controls, and third, director remuneration (Dunk & Kilgore, 1998, p. 146). 
Seven million people own shares in Australia's 1500 listed companies. Corporate 
governance will continue to evolve as a result of genuine widespread retail 
concern about capital markets. A company should be encouraged to engage in 
greater dialogue with investors about the company's sound corporate 
governance practices to differentiate it from competitors, to showcase how 
objectives are met, how risks are managed and how performance is reviewed for 
improvement (Hamilton, 2004). 
The review of practices, which have remained, unchanged or unchallenged may 
lead to better practices that maximise value. At worst, an informed confidence is 
provided about the existing board and management (Hamilton, 2004). 
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Dunk and Kilgore (1998, p. 157). found that managers realise that shareholders 
are better informed than they were ten years ago, and 89 per cent of 
respondents reported that shareholders now demand more information than they 
did ten years ago. 
The external appearance of corporate governance entails a network of public 
policies and regulatory institutions that present a level playing field and 
compliance with rules. Transparency is the essence of corporate governance and 
the protection of the rights of investors and shareholders (Adekunle, 2003, p. 
171). 
There is little value in a checklist approach to corporate governance 
that does not focus on the particular needs, strengths and 
weaknesses of the company (ASX Corporate, 2003, p. 8). 
There is no single model for good corporate governance and practices will evolve 
with the changing circumstances of the company and developments in Australia 
and overseas. Business decisions always carry risks that require effective 
management through oversight and internal controls. Enhanced board and 
management effectiveness come from keeping pace with the modern risks of 
business (ASX Corporate, 2003, p. 6). 
Role of the Board 
The board of directors ensures the company has a suitable chief executive and 
management team in place, and reviews the direction in which it proposes to 
take the company, working through any management changes along the way. To 
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do this effectively, the board must- understand the risks and opportunities facing 
the organisation (Hansell, 2003, p. 5). 
Until the 1990's academic textbooks on business management gave little 
attention to the role of the board. There were no courses in business schools on 
corporate governance, and the first dedicated book on corporate governance, in 
Canada, was not published until 1992 (Hansell, 2003, p. iii). Bosch (1995, p. 7) 
confirms that training courses concentrated on technical and managerial areas, 
rather than on the duties of directors, and developments only began in the late 
1980's. 
Attention on the duties of directors have also been aided· by progressive court 
judgments, since the 1990's, which have interpreted director's duties more 
stringently, placing more onerous and exacting legal responsibilities on company 
directors. Court cases which have arisen include those dealing with health, safety 
and environmental protection. Directors must identify the issues which need to be 
addressed by'the board, they must deal with their responsibilities, and record 
their decisions clearly (Bosch, 1995, p. 41 ). 
Leader (cited by Dang, 2000, p. 188) argues that directors "are obliged to decide 
issues by identifying the personal and derivative rights of corporate stakeholders, 
giving paramountcy to the derivative rights that equate to the ongoing health of 
the company as a viable concern." 
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Chow (1996) (cited in Dunk & Kilgore, 1998, p.146) emphasised that the need for 
management and the board to achieve sound financial performance ranked 
within the practice of sound corporate governance. Chow argues that institutional 
investors are unlikely to simply invest in a well governed company if its financial 
performance is poor, and therefore the focus of such performance will be on 
short-term measures. 
The two basic duties a director has to the company are a fiduciary duty and a 
duty of care, both powerful legal concepts. Courts are likely to deal harshly with 
directors who act contrary to one or both of these duties, but will show restraint in 
questioning decisions made by directors which are consistent with these duties. 
The theory of these duties, cited by Hansell (2003, p. 97) is "that if each director 
adheres to the appropriate standards of loyalty and care, board decisions which 
are properly motivated and appropriately thoughtful will follow." 
In Australia, company directors and other officers have legal obligations, civil and 
criminal, purs~ant to sections 180 to 184 of the Corporations Act 2001. The civil 
obligations, pursuant to sections 180 to 183 are to act with care and due 
diligence, act in good faith, not to improperly use their position to gain an 
advantage or cause a detriment, and not to improperly use information. They are 
criminally responsible, pursuant to section 184, if they are reckless or 
intentionally dishonest and fail to discharge their duties in good faith in the best 
interests of the corporation or for a proper purpose (Corporations Act, 2001 ). 
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Increased accountability at the board level can present the board with difficult 
strategic decisions concerning the direction of an organisation, what obligations it 
should enter into and what kind of alliances or partnerships are appropriate. In its 
monitoring role, the board has to be satisfied that all its obligations are met 
(Fishel, 2003, p. 7). 
The ultimate responsibility for managing a company rests with the board and it is 
the board that determines how involved it should be in management. Hansell 
(2003, p. 49) proposes that "the functions of the board and management result 
from the styles and personalities of the individuals who comprise the board and 
the management team as well as the challenges which the corporation faces 
over time." 
The board sets the ethics policies and expectations of the company, however it is 
the Chief Executive Officer ('CEO') who sets the tone which will influence day-to-
day behaviours. Directors should be independent enough to inquire or discuss 
whether the CEO's behaviour demonstrates honesty and integrity. Boards should 
be alert to any indications that the CEO, other company officers, or directors, are 
not conforming to the company's code of conduct (Cole, 2004). 
The role of a board is determined by the type of model the board functions within. 
Boards shouldn't confine themselves to rigid methods, but be flexible in their 
approach, sliding back and forth across a scale of engagement as issues and 
circumstances do. The five models proposed by Nadler (2004, p. 9), are; 
16 
1. The passive board, considered a traditional model, provides limited 
accountability, with the board's main function to ratify management decisions. 
"The board's activity and participation are minimal and at the CEO's 
discretion"; 
2. The certifying board emphasises credibility to shareholders and the 
importance of independent directors. The board oversees orderly succession 
plans, certifies management processes and ensures the CEO meets the 
board's requirements; 
3. The engaged board provides insight, advice and support on key decisions 
with the CEO. The board conducts substantive discussions on company 
issues and clearly defines its role and boundaries; 
4. The intervening board, commonly used in crisis, becomes deeply involved in 
key decision making, and holds more frequent, intense·meetings; and 
5. The operating board is considered to have strong, ongoing board 
involvement, making key decisions for management to implement. Commonly 
used in early stage business startups, where the board or top executives 
have specialised expertise but lack management experience. 
Boards can be packed with must-accomplish items to allow an in-depth 
examination of any one. Directors must overcome frustration to dig deeper into 
meatier subjects, such as strategy, planning and risk management. Frustration 
can be caused by poor communications between senior management and the 
board. Effective ways in which senior management can keep the board in the 
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dark is by providing too little information, or by providing too much (Nadler, 
2004). 
In Nadler's (2004, p. 12) study, he found that only 28 per cent of the directors 
surveyed had independent channels for obtaining useful information about their 
company. They rely on management to share the necessary information, or 
which it chooses to share. Other boards suffered from feeling that information 
was missing or that they were being prevented from doing their jobs. 
Boards are often provided with two sources of information. The first is 
retrospective data and trailing indicators of company performance and 
operations. The second is presentations by the CEO and senior management 
about the interpretation of financials and the continued vision of the company. 
Nadler (2004, p. 12) asserts that "Given those meager rations, it's no wonder 
companies get into deep trouble before their boards find out." 
Hansell (2003, p. 9) asserts three elements of a board's decision; the information 
it has available to it; the process it uses to consider that information; and the 
business judgment it applies to that information in the context of that process. 
Effective directors take positive steps to inform themselves about the industry 
and broader environment within which the company operates. Directors should 
not be dependant on management as the only source of information, otherwise 
external developments are only considered from the perspective of management 
(Hansell, 2003, p. 11 ). 
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Cohen and Grace (2001, p. 116.) assert that accountability is important, but more 
narrow a notion than responsibility. Responsibility is proactive, involving the use 
of discretion and exercising sound judgment. To make decisions, one has 
responsibility and one is to be held accountable for the decisions made. 
The board retains the responsibility of ensuring appropriate policies are in place, 
and since circumstances are continually changing, it is likely that they will 
become outdated, and therefore periodic review is essential (Bosch, 1995, p. 97). 
"Being complacent is not a good business decision (Business Executives, 2004, 
p. 25)." 
The board has a monitoring function which includes the oversight of the risk 
management process. The board should re-evaluate risk and related risk 
management strategies on a regular basis. In opposition to corporate risk 
management is corporate chance management, with the taking of risks an 
essential part of the business process and of transactions. The primary role of 
directors is to identify and benefit from business chances when they present 
themselves (Hansell, 2003, p. 6). 
A Booz Allen and Hamilton survey (cited by Bosch, 1995, p. 125) of directors of 
major Australian companies showed that 77 per cent of respondents agreed that 
"substantial scope exists for improving the practices of boards'. 
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Australian company boards typically meet 12 times a year with an average 
meeting time of five hours (Bosch, 2001, p. 5). Carter (cited by Buffini, 2004) 
asserts that there is a widening 'expectation gap' between what the public 
expects and what directors can realistically do. Directors must review the 
business strategy and approve budgets, monitor business performance, evaluate 
the chief executive, approve large investments and dividends, oversee 
management succession planning, approve executive remuneration, ensure 
major risks are identified and managed, ensure accuracy of financial reporting 
and oversee the management of general and legal compliance. "That's quite a 
job for a few weeks in a year". Boards may become risk adverse with the 
constant pressure for companies to perform and criticism of directors when they 
don't. 
Mansell (cited by Pownall, 2004, p. 14) disagrees with the view that boards are 
resistant to change, instead boards are very keen to do as well as they can. The 
mix around the board table is also changing, with those becoming directors 
having the appropriate track records and experience, but not necessarily knowing 
the others around the table. 
Wolnizer (1994) (cited by Dunk & Kilgore, 1998, p. 148) proposed that there is a 
widespread expectation that audit committees improve the standards of 
corporate governance by, amongst others, aiding in reducing fraud and 
misconduct by creating an environment of corporate discipline and control that 
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effectively reduces the opportunity_for such practices, improving the effectiveness 
of both the internal and external audit function. 
Collier's (1997, p. 104) study into audit committees found that the subjects dealt 
with by the audit committees were fairly consistent with the main subjects being 
the examination of major accounting problems, critical accounting decisions, 
adequacy of disclosures and major audit problems. In addition, the committee 
considered the nature and scope of the audit, issues raised by the auditors, 
action taken on management concerns and any major control issues. Collier also 
determined that having at least one non-executive director with an accounting 
qualification was extremely useful, but the presence of non accounting members 
was also important, as different questions are asked which. occasionally provides 
new insights (Collier, 1997, p. 1 05). 
An audit committee concerns itself with what has happened in the company. A 
risk management committee should be aligned to look ahead at what may 
happen to the company. Company management should concentrate on reducing 
risks, but also know what level of risk is consistent with the business. Rather than 
turning operational managers in to risk managers, it is more productive for them 
to have risk management procedures, which advises them on areas of risk which 
may impact their operations (Lawson, 2004). 
A KPMG study (cited by Buffini, 2004) of the top 50 ASX listed companies, and 
18 mid-sized companies showed that all had audit committee and risk 
21 
management policies, 96 per cent had clearly defined the different roles of 
directors and management, and most had required charters, policies and codes 
of conduct. However, only 66 per cent had a majority of independent directors, 
one in two audit committees weren't properly constituted, less than 20 per cent 
reported that their CEO and Chief Financial Officer ('CFO') had signed off on 
accounts, and only 47 per cent reviewed their own performance. 
The security function in corporate governance 
Position of security in the organisational hierarchy 
Amoroso (cited by Broersma, 2004) asserts that "For any company, it is virtually 
impossible to ensure protection of assets without one person owning the focal 
point." 
A study by Cavanagh (2004b) surveyed nearly 100 chief executive and company 
officers in a wide range of mid-sized (annual revenues between USD$20 million 
and USD$1 billion) companies in the U.S .. The proposal that security provides 
value for the firm and a positive return on investment was endorsed by 61 per 
cent of respondents, with 39 per cent regarding security as a cost which must be 
tightly controlled. 
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Survey results relating to contact. between chief executives and security chiefs 
showed that only 21 per cent met at least once a week and 25 per cent met at 
least monthly. In the remainder, 28 per cent met only a few times a year and 26 
per cent had never met with the security chief at any time during the previous 
year (Cavanagh, 2004b). 
Corporate security should be ingrained into the company's risk management and 
preferably there should be a seat for the security champion on all risk 
management committees. One of the primary endeavors of the Corporate 
Governance Security Model is to integrate security risk management into the day 
to day management of the company, and ensure direct access to the CEO and 
other executives, as and when required. 
Access to the CEO by the security officer has a direct impact on security 
spending. 75 per cent of companies which held weekly meetings with the security 
officer reported an increase in security spending since 9/11, compared to 30 per 
cent of those. firms where there were no meetings. In companies with monthly 
meetings, 30 per cent reported security spending increases of more than 10 per 
cent, compared with 19 per cent of companies with occasional meetings, and 9 
per cent of companies with no meetings (Cavanagh, 2004). 
Strongest support for security spending, according to Cavanagh's study, was in 
'critical industries'· which include transportation, energy, utilities, financial 
services, media and telecommunications, information technology and healthcare. 
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Following the September 11, 2001 terrorism attacks, 45 per cent of respondents 
reported no increase in security spending and most reported little increase. 
Increases in security spending was lowest amongst smaller companies. Only 28 
per cent of mid-sized companies have off-site emergency operation centres. 
Cavanagh (2004) proposed from the study that many smaller American 
companies would have difficulty conducting business in the event of a prolonged 
power outage or closure of their primary facility. 
Cavanagh's (2004) study found that the smaller the company, the less likely its 
board of directors is to establish written security guidelines, and less likely to 
have procedures in place to handle security situations. 7-1 per cent of mid-sized 
companies had board approved written guidelines on disaster recovery and 
business continuity. Only a third reported board approved, written policies 
dealing with routine security issuGs. 
Cavanagh (2004b) asserts that "articulating and championing the business case 
for security must be seen as an essential part of the role played by any corporate 
security director." This may be more difficult if security is not directly reporting to 
top management, however as security concerns become more integrated into 
strategic management, this should improve. 
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A role for the security discipline on the board and within corporate governance 
frameworks should be to compensate, not contribute to, asymmetric concern in 
dealing with risk management and crisis management. Company failures and 
debacles are generally not random events, they are the result of failures in 
governance, that grew out of the nature of the business, and the nature of human 
beings. Governance mechanisms must be rooted in an understanding of human 
nature (Tschoegl, 2000, p. 117). The security discipline should provide the board 
with the experience needed to perform rationally under stress, and to balance 
company protection with company officer entrepreneurialism and self interests. 
Corporate security directors or managers must have a sound understanding of 
corporate governance principles to ensure the security function is integrated into 
the corporate governance framework. Strong holistic security controls which are 
reported regularly to the board and designated committees, will enable alert 
watch-keeping of director, management and employee behaviour, operational 
security and loss mitigation monitoring, asset protection strategies and external 
forces, all which can cause critical stress on short and long term financial 
performance. Corporate scandals, like that of HIH, have been caused by the 
reliance on trusted directors or employees to do the right thing. It has been 
repeatedly shown that they do not always do it (Walter, 2000, p. 37). 
Senior management experience is likely to become an important qualification as 
the role of a security director moves up "the food chain" in corporate significance. 
Currently, security is mostly placed in mid-level management positions, which is 
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a modest level given the current international environment (Cavanagh, 2004a, p. 
6}. The highest levels of the organisation, the Board of Directors and its operating 
committees must be provided with the strategy, costs and related impacts of the 
security function, and the nature and probability of catastrophic and significant 
security risk events (ASIS International, 2004). 
It would seem that as social responsibilities increase and the nature of protective 
challenges evolve, the current demarcations in corporate responsibilities tend to 
blur. Operations, finance, information technology, human resources, property, 
purchasing and security departments all have a stake in creating and maintaining 
the best possible risk reduction and mitigation plans. Many companies have 
already turned their Health, Safety and Emergency (HSE) managers into HSE 
and Quality (HSEQ) managers. Other companies have turned theirs into HSE 
and Security (HSES) managers. One company in Singapore has a position 
termed CRASHES, responsible for Community Relations, Auditing, Security, 
Health, Emergency Response and Safety (Hayes & Truscott, 2004, p. 37}. 
Developments in the U.S. have created the position of a Chief Security Officer 
('CSO'), intended to be analogous to the 'C-suite', like that of the CEO, CFO and 
the Chief Information Officer ('CIO'). The CSO's role is to coordinate all security 
responsibilities throughout the organisation, report to top management and the 
board, and control the security budget, so security spending can be managed 
more effectively. The CSO concept places accountability on a single person to 
oversee the many aspects of security operations and allows for better 
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coordination and dissemination of information across the company (Cavanagh, 
2004a, p. 15). This provides an integrated security strategy with less duplication 
and lower cost (ASIS International, 2004). 
Allison (cited by Cavanagh, 2004a, p. 27} asserts that " ... security professionals 
must be comfortable in the governance arena as well as in operations ... They 
must also be able to articulate the case for security measures that affect overall 
company policy and operations. The business protection challenge is huge." 
ASIS International CSO Guidelines (2004, p. 9) propose that the CSO must have 
the skills to accomplish the following; 
• Relate to and communicate with senior executives, the Board of Directors and 
operating committees; 
• Understand the strategic direction and goals of the business, and how 
security intertwines with strategic needs; 
• Understand and assess the impact of external and internal changes on 
security risk; 
• Ensure security and related ethical issues are appropriately investigated and 
resolved with limited impact on business operations; 
• Facilitate the use of traditional and advanced scenario planning techniques 
for senior management, the Board of Directors and employees; 
• Successfully network and develop working relationships with external and 
internal resources; 
• Promote organisational learning and knowledge sharing; 
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• Be politically astute, but not politically motivated; 
• Be realistic and comprehend the need to assess financial, employee and 
customer implications in plans and recommendations; 
• Function as an integral partner of the senior management team; and 
• Develop sound organisational security awareness, which is appropriate for 
the business and organisational culture. 
Security Risk Management 
There are varying forms of risk and they include credit risk, liquidity risk, market 
risk and operational risk. Operational risk encompasses management fraud, 
failure of computer systems, human error, failure of safety systems, and most 
relevant in this text, security failures (Harper, Keller & Pfeil, 2000, p. 5). 
Academic finance and management literature has paid attention to risk 
management of market and credit risks, but has largely ignored operational risk, 
which includes inter alia, problems with information systems, operational 
problems, breaches in internal control, fraud and unforeseen crises. Tschoegl 
(2000, p. 1 04) asserts that " ... there are almost no articles dealing with 
misbehaviour in organizations." 
A survey by the Institute of Internal Auditors (cited by Gettler, 2004, p. 42) held 
that only 13 per cent of Australian CFO's considered the ASX Corporate 
Governance Guideline's (2003) requirement to sign off on risk management 
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strategies would have a positive impact on the company. Only 20 per cent were 
in favour of having external auditors verify their risk management controls. 
ASX Listing Rule 4.1 0 deals with corporate governance disclosure practices in 
the form of Guidance Note 9 (2001). Item 8 specifically deals with 'business risl<, 
and "the board's approach to identifying areas of significant business risk, and to 
putting arrangements in place to manage therri'. Guidance in risk management 
refers to Standards Australia 'Risk Management' AS/NZS 4630 (1995). 
A 2003 Connect 4 survey (cited by Fenton-Jones, 2004) determined that 
Australia's top 200 listed companies increased spending on audits by 10 per cent 
to $175 million. The increase was attributed to an inc~ease in dealing with 
corporate governance compliance issues. Revenue of board advisory services 
increased by 60 per cent over the previous two years. Risk management in 
particular was seen as the main compliance issue. 
The Cadbury. Committee Working Group (cited by Mills, 1997, p. 124) defines 
internal controls as; 
... a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following 
categories - effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of 
financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations (Cadbury Committee Working Group, 1993). 
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Mills (1997, p. 124) asserts, based on the Cadbury definition, that internal 
controls should be embedded into the entity's activities, and through their 
integration, provide quality control, prevent unnecessary costs, and protect the 
company against unwelcome surprises. Dang (2000, p. 145) upon analysis of the 
collapse of Barings Bank, asserts that "internal controls are vital". 
Risk assessment and management, forming part of internal controls and 
corporate governance, can be seen in a positive vein because a value-creation 
framework offers much potential for drawing together many key corporate 
governance issues from a holistic perspective (Mills, 1993, p. 139). 
In Mills' (1993) study into internal control practices within large UK companies, 
76.9 per cent responded that their internal controls were riot restricted to financial 
ones. Only 13.8 per cent and 6.9 per cent responded that the effectiveness of 
their internal controls was interpreted as resulting in reducing risk of material loss 
and reasonable assurance that company's assets are safeguarded, respectively 
(Mills, 1993, p. 132). 
Risk analysis is used to highlight schemes where profitability is subject to greater 
than normal uncertainty, so that attention can be drawn to areas requiring closer 
control. Appleby (1987, p. 82) asserts that both sensitivity and risk analysis 
complement one another in their approach to reducing uncertainty in strategy 
and tactics. 
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Most companies today, particularly larger public companies, can demonstrate 
extensive and at times, impressive risk management systems, however these 
generally relate to financial risks, market risks, credit risks, workplace safety and 
environmental risks. In contrast, the greatest risks have been shown to be the 
willful and ignorant misconduct of employees and management. Unethical and 
criminal misconduct is often difficult to detect and can directly result from 
organisational culture (Walter, 2000, p. 34). 
Ealy (1993) (cited in Mills, 1993, p. 128) proposes that risk management ensures 
earnings and assets are protected and that it is particularly important for it to be 
integrated with top management and corporate strategy. Porter's (1992) Five 
Forces and Value Chain Analysis recognised that risk can arise at the entity-wide 
or activity level. 
Risk needs to be identified and managed, not only financial risks, but also other 
risks which could affect the company's future as a going concern. The Cadbury 
Committee Working Group proposed that to achieve this, directors should be 
constantly aware of the external environment in which the company is operating 
(Mills, 1993, p. 129). 
Mills (1993) study also sought to identify how companies define and assess 
business risk. 56.6 per cent of respondents defined risk as an event or 
occurrence which may have a significant effect on the operational or financial 
stability of the group. Only 6. 7 per cent defined security of assets as a key risk. 
31 
Mills found that management were most likely to give attention to risks that 
impacted on immediate profitability and cash flow. This is consistent with a 
previous study (Marsh, 1991) in which it was found that greater concern was 
shown to short-term factors and longer-term strategic issues were seen as less 
important (Mills, 1993, p. 135). 
Company stakeholders expect the board and executive management to identify 
and anticipate areas of risk and have in place a holistic strategy to mitigate or 
reduce those risks. The expectation extends to management responding in a 
highly effective manner to events and incidents which threaten the assets and 
earnings of the company. The continued monitoring and mitigation of risk and 
loss is the responsibility of the governing board and senior management, and 
provides a positive impact to profitability (ASIS International, 2004; Cromie, 2004, 
p. 21). 
Clarke and Dean (2001, p. 80) stated that the dominant similarity between the 
major Australian corporate failures over the last five decades is the 'surprise' 
response to the disclosure of the company's distress. 
Provisions for taking 'all reasonable care' as found in environmental protection 
and occupational health and safety legislation, is applicable to a security function. 
Taking all reasonable care serves as a process in which directors and 
management put in place systems and procedures necessary to enable the 
corporation to comply with statutory and industry obligations, and to monitor the 
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operation of those systems to ensure that they continue to achieve compliance 
objectives (Hansell, 2003, p. 144). 
Class action litigation in the U.S. has seen courts alter the legal definition of a 
'forseeable event' to indicate that a 'terrorist act' and computer viruses and 
worms are forseeable events. In action brought against airlines, airport security 
companies and airplane manufacturers following 9/11, the court determined that 
"the danger of a plane crashing if unauthorized individuals invaded the cockpit 
was a risk that the plane manufacturer should reasonably have foreseen". 
Computer viruses were determined to be foreseeable due to the number, and 
regularity, of bulletins issued by software companies regarding viruses, worms 
and computer attacks (Cook, 2004). 
The author proposes that significant business risks have emerged in the current 
climate of international terrorism, reviews of critical infrastructure protection and 
growth in sophisticated, transnational organised and electronic crime. Current 
corporate governance guidelines recommend that these significant risks should 
be managed in accordance with AS/NZS 4630 however, complimenting models 
should also be investigated. 
It remains to be seen if the usual ways of doing business will prove 
adequate to the challenge of managing corporate security in an increasingly 
threatening international environment (Cavanagh, 2004a, p. 5) 
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The following recent events highlight the emergence of significant security 
related business risks and include, or support, calls for security guidelines to be 
integrated in to corporate governance practices; 
• The Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department, in concert with other 
Australian Government agencies with responsibilities for critical 
infrastructure protection is seeking to strengthen relationships with owners 
and operators of the nation's critical infrastructure in the form of the 
Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) (Yates, 2004, p. 15). 
• New maritime counter-terrorism standards are being enforced by the U.S. 
through the International Maritime Organisation. Countries and maritime 
related businesses failing to meet security standards risk having their 
ships and exports turned away from U.S. ports (Pitsis, 2004, p. 4). 
• The Australian Institute of Criminology estimates that consumer-based 
internet fraud is between 5 to 1 0 per cent of all online transactions. The 
National Office for the Information Economy estimates about 1.5 per cent 
of all credit card sales over the internet is fraudulent. All merchants must 
now meet new EMV smart card standards by 2006 (Fenton-Jones, 2003, 
p. 47). 
• Australia's four major banks (Commonwealth Bank, ANZ Bank, National 
Australia Bank and Westpac Bank) were criticised for failing to clearly 
warn and equip online banking customers of hoax emails and websites 
perpetrating online banking frauds (Moullakis, 2004, p. 5). 
• Australian on-line betting sites have been targeted by Russian extortion 
gangs, who have effectively closed the sites down by flooding them with 
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traffic, after the companie$ refused to pay extortion money (Legard, 2004). 
The U.S. is also seeing an escalation of cyber-extortion attacks targeted at 
a-commerce companies (Vijayan, 2004). 
• The US National Counterintelligence Executive reported that in 2001 the 
combined costs of foreign and domestic economic espionage, including 
intellectual property theft, was US$300 billion. All companies must 
carefully review their security policies (Gengler, 2003, p. 7). 
• Mroz and Conner (2003, p. 6) argue that cybersecurity is a business and 
corporate governance issue that must be addressed by corporate chief 
executives and boards of directors. What is lacking is a corporate 
governance framework that allows effective execution. 
• The 2003 Economic Crime Survey determined that 'Economic Crime' is a 
significant threat and found that one third of respondents stressed the 
company's board had ultimate responsibility for preventing or managing 
economic crime, but only just over a quarter had given their boards any 
risk management training (Economic Crime Survey, 2003, p. 3). 
• The Australian National University has introduced a new master's course 
elective titled "Security in Business and Government' as the university 
perceived there was no course on offer in Australia that looked at 
protective security from a senior management perspective (Williams, 
2003, p. 13). 
Warning signs prior to the collapse of large companies, such as HIH, were shown 
to have been ignored, misunderstood or were not sufficiently communicated to 
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force pre-emptive action by the. board. Warning signs included concerns raised 
by regulators, downgrading of credit ratings and conference papers (White, 2001, 
p. 59). Applying such a warning to the security environment, the author proposes 
signs such as threats and attacks to Australian interests from terrorist groups, 
national intelligence agency issues, sustained increase in fraud and computer 
crime, and warnings from international security, police and military experts of 
impending terrorist attacks in Australia. 
In this context, security's fundamental task, as part of risk management and the 
corporate governance framework is to; 
1. Identify security risk from consultation with management and outside 
advisors; 
2. Evaluate risks to determine appropriate security management strategies; 
3. Review the risk management strategy to satisfy themselves with the way 
management proposes to manage each of the principal risks; 
4. Monitor the security management process from management reports 
which. should describe major occurrences or less significant occurrences 
which suggest a trend; and 
5. Take remedial action of any material breach of the controls or pattern of 
immaterial breaches, discuss with management the remedial action 
required, and monitor the implementation and effectiveness of any action 
taken (Hansell, 2003, p. 6; Pausenberger & Nassauer, 2000, p. 265). 
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The Corporate Governance Security Model (Annexure 3) demonstrates how the 
security function can be applied to the recommended corporate governance 
practices to enhance performance outcomes. The outcomes proposed by the 
model are; 
1. The board recognises its responsibility for security risk management and 
security compliance and control; 
2. The board accepts security as a profession and seeks specialist advice on 
security issues when necessary; 
3. Security behaviour and risk management is recognised and practiced 
within the board and corporate culture; 
4. Security controls are maintained and reviewed by the board; 
5. Security risk management is recognised by the· board as a long term 
revenue enhancer; 
6. Security related risks are managed for disclosure of 'sensitive' information; 
and 
7. Shareholders are ensured that the company's physical, information and 
electronic security and integrity is maintained. 
The security function at a board and executive level can enhance corporate 
governance by identifying security and risk management opportunities, formulate 
strategic security and protection policy, and manage operations to improve and 
protect returns on investments, supporting the principle of shareholder 
optimisation. 
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Duncan, Gale, Tofflemore anq Yaksick (1992, p. 7) argue that in light of 
security's ability to maximise shareholder value, security risk management in 
corporations should be viewed as a specialised application of financial 
management. They define security risk management as activities associated with 
making and implementing investment decisions in anticipation of or following 
contingent losses. 
The objective of security is to protect and enhance all asset types, and therefore 
expenditures on security constitute investments in the organisation. By adopting 
corporate finance theory in security management, a security investment 
methodology identifies strategies that maximise the net present value of the 
investment (Duncan et al, 1992, p. 12). 
It is the security director's role to ensure that corporate security management is 
effective, and does not waste resources on security items the company does not 
need, or may not need at the time. The provision of sound security analysis and 
management proposals to the board and executive management allows the 
company to consider and approve a balanced security plan. This promotes 
efficient spending to reduce 'under' or 'over' investment in security systems, and 
provides board approved security procedures to counter risks which can severely 
impact the company's reputation, intellectual and physical assets, and its ability 
to recover from crisis. 
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The application of security to corporate governance should involve the board or 
designated committee formulating the security policy of the organisation and 
developing appropriate security practices and culture. Strategic security planning 
should be in line with corporate direction and key resources, directing the board 
and executive management in protecting all asset types, mitigating loss and 
providing accountability for corporate governance. 
Measurement of the security function should be based on the economic value 
added to the organisation following effective and balanced security and business 
protection strategies which has shielded principle business. Rewards to all 
stakeholders come from sound and comprehensive business and risk 
management which provides variable compensation in the form of providing long-
term revenue enhancement. 
McClure (1997, p. 16) citing Toft (1997) demonstrates security's ability to 
generate profit through the practice of risk management, as outlined in Figure 1. 
Cost of 
Risk 
Cost of managing and 
controlling risks 
identified 
Predicted cost of risks with no control 
Savings in costs 
Predicted cost of risks with control 
Time 
Figure 1: Risk management's ability to generate profit 
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In the area of board decision making, security assessments can contribute to 
probability forecasts which determines the probability of outcomes occurring. 
Risk is considered when selecting projects and choices will be dependant on the 
board's attitude to risk (Appleby, 1987, p. 82; Pausenberger & Nassauer, 2000, 
p. 272). Having access to the security discipline at the board level provides 
diversity in contribution and specialist skill in security risk management applied to 
business risk management. 
In IT security, the most overlooked aspects are often the most important: 
passwords, training and awareness. Security and IT managers need to 
demonstrate to company executives how to take better advantage of the systems 
it already has through the use of security. There must. be a champion at the 
board level offering senior management support in order to get things done. 
Often the most useful skill is how to communicate the security message in a way 
management and non-technical people within the company can understand and 
can support (Rohde, 2004). 
Company reputation, uninterrupted reliability of technical infrastructures, normal 
business processes, protection of physical and financial assets, employee safety 
and shareholder confidence all rely, in some measure upon the effectiveness of 
an accountable, senior security function. The potential conflicting objectives 
among mid-level managers, often dispersing accountability, is not suitable, and 
can lead to a decentralised and uncoordinated security function (ASIS 
International, 2004). 
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In the context of corporate security, company officers performing in a highly 
competitive market, may be viewed as a corporate risk, particularly with the 
potential for fraud and misuse of information. Security's role on the board should 
be to ensure that the company has in place strategies which apply systems to 
appropriately monitor and detect unauthorised conduct. 
When a significant change occurs in the external environment the board 
must consider whether a response is required (Bosch, 1995, p. 94). 
By introducing security risk management to corporate governance, the Board is 
recognising its accountability and responsibility to the security function. Security 
risk management should contribute to the reduction of risks of financial distress 
and failure, and upon consideration of the market, is likely to result in an 
improved competitive position in the company's product and labour market. This 
includes the interests of employees as a whole. Employees and company agents 
have a demonstrated interest in the success of a company, as they also incur 
substantial costs should the company fail. Highly skilled managerial employees 
make major commitments to the company and also look to continued growth of 
the company to provide them with rewards, in the form of promotion, status and 
job security (Kaen, 2000, p. 253). 
Governments and regulatory agencies should support the development and 
functioning of risk management products and markets, like security, that assist 
managers and directors in carrying out their responsibilities. This support should 
be consistent with viewing the corporation as an institution, which promotes 
economic efficiency in the market place (Kaen, 2000, p. 259). 
41 
Crisis and disaster recovery planning 
... the timely identification of risks threatening the existence of the 
corporation will be meaningless if the management board doesn't take 
adequate counteracting measures (Pausenberger & Nassauer, 2000, p. 
272). 
Companies will often be in conflict. Even when all parties act in good faith and 
with probity, conflicts and failures still occur. Honestly managed companies can 
fall victim of natural forces, market fluctuations and investor sentiment. Everyone 
honestly pursuing their self interest will create rather than eliminate conflict 
(Cohen & Grace, 2001, p. 101 ). 
Crises and disasters will occur and will demand priority over routine matters. 
Bosch (1995, p. 1 05) makes the comparison between the flow of director's work 
with that of a war army. The army spends 99 per cent of their time waiting and 
training, and only 1 per cent of their time in battle, same with that of the director, 
as in most organisations crises occur and peaks of extraordinary pressure. 
Destruction of assets by fire or explosion, serious strikes, legal actions, product 
sabotage leading to a major product recall is likely to demand the special 
attention of the board (Bosch, 1995, p. 1 06). Crises and stresses are infrequent 
and their impact may be greatly reduced by preparation and planning, including 
the ability for directors to seek independent professional advice if necessary 
(Bosch, 1995, p.121). 
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Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was an expectation that there 
would be a widespread move in the U.S. to centralise the corporate security 
function under the control of a Chief Security Officer, which would report directly 
to the CEO. While there was a move towards improved coordination, security 
management remains decentralised in most U.S. companies. There are 
indications of an evolution, not a revolution, in corporate security management 
(Cavanagh, 2004a, p. 4). 
Given the vital role played by smaller companies in the U.S. economy, the 
economic impact could be quite severe should we suffer another 9/11 type 
attack in heavily populated areas (Cavanagh, 2004b). 
From all major regions in the U.S., 47 per cent of companies reported a drop in 
revenue following 9/11, with 80 per cent reporting disruption to business, mainly 
from interrupted business travel. In comparison, a major power outage in August 
2003, caused 21 per cent disruption to business travel, and 13 per cent drop in 
revenues. This accounts for a greater severity to business from the impact of a 
terrorist attack. Cavanagh concludes that future assessment of corporate 
vulnerabilities should bear these findings in mind. 
Lets suppose a terrorist attack occurs in an Australian city, and a major public 
company is severely affected (financially or physically) and the company has no 
crisis response or disaster recovery plan in place. Suppose the public and 
authorities become aware and choose to take recoursive action of some kind, 
either legally or publicly. There is a very real risk of harm to the company's 
reputation and financial viability if it is proven to be negligent in taking reasonable 
care against such a risk. However, if the company can demonstrate that it had 
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sufficient security risk management systems and plans in place (and therefore 
that any failure is not an indication of a systemic, general, fault), the company's 
reputation and legal standing is significantly less severely damaged as it 
otherwise would be (Cook, 2004). 
Security risk management should comply with corporate governance guidelines 
in managing significant business risk, conform with Australian Standards 
4360:2004 and continually monitor Australian and international case law in 
respect of security related incidents which have resulted in litigation or legal 
review. The security function integrated with corporate governance frameworks, 
as proposed by the Corporate Governance Security Model, contributes to a 
favourable perception of the company by demonstrati"ng that security risk is 
recognised as a significant business risk and the company has risk management 
systems in place in the event of security events, up to and including a major 
terrorist attack on itself, a competitor, a client or supplier. 
The reality is that companies, regardless of size, are not immune to 
disruptive and dangerous attacks from many sources (Business Executives, 
2004, p. 9). 
A 2004 study by the Economist Intelligence Unit ("EIU") (cited by Broersma, 
2004) conducted an online survey with 254 senior executives from Europe (40 
per cent), the U.S. (27 per cent) and the Asia-Pacific (21 per cent) and found that 
78 per cent considered security to be the top network-related issue, whilst the 
same number admitted to opening email attachments from unknown sources. 
Seventy per cent of respondents were from small and medium-sized firms and 
44 
represented the financial services, professional services, manufacturing, 
transportation and energy sectors. 
Respondents to the EIU study indicated that 83 per cent of their attacks were 
initiated internally, which included sabotage, espionage and mistakes. In the 
previous survey, security was considered to be the second largest issue, behind 
reliability and availability. 
The study found that security spending was moving from perimeter protection 
and intrusion detection to better methods for preventing attacks and recovery. 32 
per cent indicated that they used or planned to use managed security services in 
the next two years, with 14 per cent saying they would us~ them in the long term. 
The survey found that chief executives are increasingly taking responsibility for 
network security policy, while some companies are beginning to appoint a chief 
security officer. 
Benefits of Corporate Governance 
It is one thing to make non-binding guidelines available, and quite another to 
expect corporate entities to abide by them in the absence of rewards, 
incentives or some evidence that these changes will bring tangible benefits 
to the stakeholders of the organisation (Sarre, 2001, p. 305). 
When organisations deal with a fault or issue, its proactive nature can actually 
enhance its reputation, not by what the problem is, but by dealing with it and 
showing that the company was ready to deal with it in an appropriate manner 
which displays integrity (Cohen & Grace, 2001, p. 11 0). A proactive and 
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innovative response to the curr~nt security environment, with its current high 
profile, can launch a company's credibility in its risk management, corporate 
governance and its potentiallongivity. A response of denial, inaction or indecision 
can have dire consequences to the reputation of the company in the market 
place, the directors and therefore the company value to its stakeholders. 
Preparedness requires the development of company and industry specific 
programs and procedures. In relation to preparing for potential terrorist threats in 
Australia, experience in the U.S. has shown that companies of all sizes desire 
guidance on what constitutes a reasonable response for developing 
Preparedness and Response Plans (Business Executives, 2004). In most cases, 
the business community will not be knowledgeable about the roles, 
responsibilities or interactions of public health, safety, emergency and security 
agencies. 
Making investment decisions with a lack of information, experience and under 
high levels of uncertainty is extremely difficult. Companies are susceptible of 
investing incorrect amounts, in incorrect activities or those which provide lower 
than optimal returns. The decision to invest in terrorism mitigation is such a 
decision. There is difficulty in quantifying the terrorism threat in Australia by the 
lack of information on the context of terrorism, identifying company risks to 
terrorism, analysing those risks, vulnerabilities and probabilities, and treating 
those risks. The decision process must evaluate the effectiveness of any 
counter-terrorism measure (Yates, 2003). 
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Yates proposes that there are few people in Australia with any experience in the 
complexities of terrorist action recovery and the consequence of information 
uncertainty in decision making is likely to result in a sub-optimal investment in 
critical infrastructure protection (Yates, 2003). 
International terrorist attacks and the radical perpetrators present the world with a 
grave crisis. Rumsfeld (cited by McGeough, 2004, p. 44) asserts that terrorism is 
not solely a military conflict, instead it is multi-dimensional, with political and 
economic focus. 
It is not possible to develop a generic Preparedness and Response Plan which 
would be effective for the diverse size, nature, location, activity and structure of 
business organisations. Company specific risk assessments must be conducted, 
with those exhibiting strong public profiles, reliance or control on critical 
infrastructure or known political ties identifying themselves as attractive targets 
for attack (Business Executives, 2004). 
Corporate threats in the current international security environment can come 
from radical international organisations, domestic extremist groups, organised 
crime networks and current or past employees. Companies must plan for a 
variety of attacks and events, and understand the governmental framework in 
place to respond to each event. Other responses include addressing personnel 
health and safety, emotional distress and a plethora of business continuation 
issues (Business Executives, 2004). 
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The scope and scale of the. U.S. and European threats of terrorism and 
organised crime, measured against Australia's standing indicates that Australian 
companies are not sufficiently prepared for a significant crisis, such as a major 
terrorist strike. 
The costs of a crisis event in Australia can be significant. In 1998 an explosion 
occurred at the Longford Gas Plant in Bass Strait. As a result, oil production was 
reduced by $750 million, with 40% of this amount intended for the 
Commonwealth Government in taxes and a further $1.3 billion cost to the 
Victorian economy. The uncaptured costs in the event of infrastructure 
unavailability, or cost of accidents by infrastructure users, include losses to 
national economic activity, slow down of regional economic growth and 
decreases in national productivity (Yates, 2003). 
In July 1996, the President of Daiwa Bank, Japan, received a letter from an 
employee confessing to fraud and embezzlement resulting in losses of US$1.1 
billion. Aware that the bank had failed to supervise the employee appropriately, 
the board made a critical mistake. They did nothing, floundering to make a 
decision. After two weeks, the bank informally informed the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF). The MOF also kept quiet and allowed the board to continue debating on 
a course of action. It took three months to finally notify the MOF and the Federal 
Reserve. The bank was subsequently indicted in the U.S. for conspiring to hide 
the losses, was required to close its U.S. operations upon losing its banking 
licence, and paid $340 million in fines (Tschoegl, 2000, p. 1 09). 
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The leadership and experience· of the board will be required in the event of a 
company crisis. The three obvious stages to a crisis are; before the crisis, during 
the crisis and after the crisis, and .there is a role for the board at each stage 
(Hansell, 2003, p. 127). 
A company should have, as a minimum, a generic response plan which can be 
adapted and implemented in the event of a crisis situation. The role of the board 
should be to review any crisis response plan developed by management 
(Hansell, 2003, p. 127). In the event of a crisis, one of the issues will be how the 
directors will discharge their responsibilities effectively. The most efficient 
manner will be to strike a committee to deal with or oversee the matter. Another 
important consideration is to ensure that the board is independent of the issue, 
particularly in cases where impropriety on the part of the board or senior 
management is concerned (Hansell, 2003, p. 129). 
Following a crisis, either within the company, or related to its business or market, 
there should be a full post assessment and debriefing of all relevant facts. 
Following immediate litigation considerations, the executive and the board should 
openly discuss the crisis and its management effectiveness with the aim to learn 
from the experience. Walter (2000, p. 35) asserts that" ... when a disaster occurs, 
everyone in the industry should know about it and be well informed on the issues 
involved." 
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A closer look at some of the major corporate disasters shows that trouble began 
with initial inadvertent behaviour which got worse, with subsequent efforts being 
to cover up the situation. The Daiwa Bank case study showed that the crisis was 
the result of unauthorised employee behaviour and then director behaviour. 
There were circumstances within the company, which allowed this to occur. 
Managerial trends, which have increased the scope for fraud, according to 
Huntington (cited by Tschoegl, 2000, p. 113) are: matrix management, 
decentralisation and the encouragement of the managerial entrepreneurialism. 
"Of these, decentralisation and the encouragement of entrepreneurialism are 
most relevant to fraud and embezzlement cases." 
Security culture 
Boyce (cited by Eyers, 2004) asserts that the introduction of guidelines and 
regulations will make little difference if the corporate culture isn't right. Good 
corporate governance is reliant on the basic principles of acting in good faith, 
viewing issues from other stakeholder's point of view, and taking responsibility for 
actions and decisions. 
Corporate culture is defined by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) in section 
12.3(6) as an: " ... attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing 
within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which 
the relevant activities take place." Trompenaars (cited by Quirke, 1996, p. 1 08) 
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defines culture as " ... a shared system of meanings. It dictates what we pay 
attention to, how we act, and what we value." Nadler (2004, p. 14) suggests 
culture is " ... a system of informal, unwritten, yet powerful norms derived from 
shared values that influence behaviour". 
A company with a poor corporate culture may be considered culpable under the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), as well as, the individual directors. According to 
Sarre (2001, p. 31 0) the legislation was designed for situations which, contrary to 
the existence of documentation appearing to require compliance, the reality was 
that non-compliance was expected. An example may include reckless 
endangerment where the corporate culture inferred authorised breaches of safety 
codes to increase productivity, despite documented safety procedures. 
Organisational culture influences how people listen to company communications, 
such as an acute sensitivity to business speak, and a suspicion that it betrays old 
values. Quirke (1996, p. 14) asserts that "culture reflects communication". The 
company must know how their employee's listen, you may say one thing, but 
people hear another. Any security and risk communication must consider the 
methods most suited to the organisational culture of the subject company. 
Most companies are not in control of their culture; their culture is in control 
of them (Quirke, 1996, p. 16). 
Cohen and Grace (2001, p. 113) assert that the company CEO and the board 
must be convinced of the benefits, of any kind, to commit to a type of 
organisational culture. In terms of implementing security into corporate 
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governance, whatever the reasons, the message from the top down must be that 
the company wants to develop and maintain a security culture. If the message is 
that the company recognises its need to develop security functions, security 
behaviour and a sound security environment, and if the message is serious and 
sincere, then those things themselves become the focus for the conduct of 
organisational matters. 
Mcartney (cited by Fitzgerald, 2004} asserts that most employees don't consider 
security their responsibility, citing that the company has a security department. 
They have the mentality that security is someone else's problem, not theirs. 
Mcartney considers security to be comparable with quality assurance in the 
1980's; "Like quality, these virtues are either [ingrained] in an organization or 
they're not. You can't put up a sign and create them." 
What has become vital to manage any organisation is the ability to foster and 
facilitate communication within it. As the effectiveness of 'formal controls' 
diminishes, and the importance of line power decreases, the importance of 
managing the culture as a means of keeping the organisation secure and on 
course is paramount, and contributes added value to stakeholders, long term 
revenue and company longevity (Quirke, 1996}. 
To be most effective, risk management should become part of the 
organisation's culture (AS/NZS 4360:1999). 
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Senior management commitment is the single most important factor in the 
success or failure of any risk management program, and sets the style to the 
toleration of imprudent or unsupervised risk-taking. There also needs to be an 
overarching corporate culture which leads to the issue of behavior modification 
techniques (Hayes & Truscott, 2004, p. 37; Walter, 2000, p. 25; ASIS 
International, 2004, p. 5). 
Wartofsky (cited by McClure, 1997, p. 18) argues that cultural surroundings will 
influence people's perception of risk, and to see risk in a certain manner. Cultural 
influences come from values which are "socially constituted, socially learned and 
socially enforced." A corporate culture may be one where the need to comply 
with security policy and practices is non-existent. A weak security culture will 
influence the degree of apathy towards the provision and practice of security. 
Security decay theory is concerned with the effect of security on the behaviour on 
personnel. The theory proposes that apathy is a result of effective security 
preventing threat occurrence. In McClure's (1997} study into security decay 
theory, the implementation of protection on risk analysis results may, if the level 
of protection is higher than needed, cause an over emphasis on security which 
will cause security to be seen as unnecessary. This results in security decay, 
where security measures are in place, but they are no longer operating to their 
intended level of effectiveness. 
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There is a delicate balance needed between the minimal and maximum security 
countermeasures. McClure (1997, p. 20) asserts that "Too little security may 
result in high risk materialisation, while too much security may result in decay 
leading to risk materialisation." 
The ACCC (cited by Cohen & Grace, 2001, p. 1 05) has stated that strong 
compliance programs, such as ethical requirements and culture, do lead to a 
competitive advantage and value to shareholders. Quality characteristics of a 
company can enhance marketing and give positive return to bottom-line benefits. 
Kuada and Gullestrup's (1998, p. 27) study into the cultural context of corporate 
governance showed that culture impacts on governance and accountability, and 
apart from macrocultural influences, each company develops its own 
organisational culture. 
An effective security function is reliant on an integrating organisational structure 
and culture. Where the security function resides in an organisation will determine 
its authority and power base, and in turn its ability to contribute to strategic policy 
and influence decision makers. The culture of the organisation is just as 
important. The strength of the security culture will impact on the affect of the 
security function (Blades & McClure, 2003, p. 68). 
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Governance reform should be viewed as a catalyst for boards to change their 
cultures. When directors begin to develop cultures which promote candor and a 
willingness to challenge, they will reflect the social and work dynamics of a high 
performance team. As the board and management begin to start performing as a 
team, the organisational culture will change. Nadler (2004, p. 14) asserts that 
"The closer directors get to an engaged culture, the closer they are to being the 
best boards possible." 
McKnight (cited by Fitzgerald, 2004) proposed that company cultures are hard to 
change but that they can become more security-conscious -. "though only if top 
management leads the way." He asserts that companies must give attention to 
four areas: user awareness, physical security, new and old technologies, and 
policy. Companies should have a mandatory security awareness program for all 
employees, including the CEO. As an example, corporate security policies can 
protect vital information assets by way of discouraging employees from putting 
data on any devices that leave the borders of the physical corporate building. 
Managing the corporate culture is increasingly crucial from a security 
perspective, as the very nature of corporate security is changing in response to 
significant business risks. Increasingly, the "inner-market", incorporating those 
working in and comprising the company, become 'knowledge workers' and 
independent professionals, whose behavior cannot be directly monitored or 
evaluated (Quirke, 1996, p.15). This creates a security risk and is a challenge for 
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the board to control. Quirke (199.6, p. 15) asserts that "hierarchical power can no 
longer be relied on to deliver dictates from the top." 
A study by Gurdon (2001) into new employee socialisation and the security 
function proposes that companies should have a socialisation and security 
framework, which incorporates practices to encourage and reinforce security 
related positive behaviour. From a security prospective, behavioural standards 
should promote and maintain a security conscious and ethical culture, which 
reflects the organisation's nature and industry affiliation. 
Gurdon (2001, p. 1 06) proposes that "Motivating employees to be vigilant and 
supportive of security activities will be difficult to achieve without positive 
reinforcement. .. the security function must, at a minimum, support behavioural 
standards, the reporting of dishonest activity, and adherence to policy and 
procedures." 
Positive reinforcement, through recognition and awards, should have the support 
of management and the board. Top level support will establish the legitimacy of 
the socialisation and security association. Informal reinforcers, such as feedback, 
should be diligently applied to prevent security decay. Punishment and negative 
reinforcement should be applied to undesirable or 'security risk' behaviour. 
Guidelines should exist which detail how punishment is to be applied. During any 
disciplinary process, the cultural influence of the workgroup should also be 
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examined, and behavioural standards and security-based training altered if 
required (Gurdon, 2001, p. 1 08). 
Codes of Conduct 
Australian organisations, following the lead from the U.S., have adopted codes 
as part of the reform of business culture. Farnham (cited in Cohen & Grace, 
2001, p. 120) showed in his study into codes that while they are not as frequently 
or appropriately used by employees as would be desired, nevertheless they are 
significant in changing behaviour in corporations. 
Codes are well adapted to the needs of corporations, as they are not natural 
persons but a legal entity which has a culture, but no character, conscience or 
emotional life. Codes of conduct are a way of setting standards and guiding 
conduct (Cohen & Grace, 2001, p. 121; Dang, 2000, p. 16; Bosch, 1995, p. 187). 
Security addressed in the code of conduct will not take the place of other security 
measures, but the tact that they cannot do everything does not mean that they 
are useless. -
The production and implementation of a code is the directors and manager's 
responsibility. Cohen and Grace (2001, p. 122) assert than unless the culture has 
been subject to an audit and declared safe, it is a risk to use any other standard 
to which the provisions of the code can be measured. Codes should be 'rolled 
out', rather than just posted and appeal to the probity of all company members. 
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Cohen and Grace (2001, p. 122) discuss 'institutionalising ethics in corporations' 
and offer nine schematic guidelines. Leadership is considered the most important 
factor in staff compliance with corporate norms, and creating and sustaining an 
organisational culture. Applying these guidelines to enhancing a security culture, 
the schematic guidelines proposed are; 
1. The board of directors and management must be publicly committed to 
security in actions and words. Hypocrisy must be avoided by those 
responsible for managing a corporation (Cohen & Grace, 2001, p. 22; 
Walter, 2000, p. 34). Commitment is shown by including security policy in 
corporate governance statements ; 
2. Policies and procedures are developed for addressing security issues and 
events which may impact on business activities; 
3. Security functions are included in the corporate code of conduct, regularly 
considered in decision making and training is provided. While these are 
tangible signs of security awareness, they are not recognised as 
standalone security measures; 
4. Adequate security advice, either internal or external, is available to field 
security questions, monitor compliance with security procedures and to 
recommend revision of the code and policies; 
5. Security training programs form a regular part of staff development and 
induction; 
6. Sound security behaviour is rewarded and never punished for not 
producing results; 
7. Insecure behaviour is not rewarded even if it gets bottom line results; 
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8. Employees should not be exposed to avoidable security situations that put 
them at risk and should be provided with secure work environments; and 
9. Individuals should be encouraged to discuss security concerns with 
supervisors and report misconduct via credible whistleblower and 
reporting systems. 
Communicating security 
In changing or introducing a security culture, the role of communication should be 
to create awareness that the security problem the organisation faces has 
changed, in the face of the inclination to avoid the harsh reality. Changes in 
culture occur when people realise that the old ways of doing things are only 
suitable to an environment which has passed. It is ·easier to change the 
organisation when the people share an understanding of the security situation 
they face, the inappropriateness of old behaviour and the need to find new 
solutions (Quirke, 1996, p. 1 09). 
To achieve the best results security needs to be humanised, as has been done 
with safety. In the absence of strategic information, every employee must watch 
out for and actively report suspicious activity. It is essential that there is a system 
of collecting security related information as intelligence. This is the only chance 
to obtain an early warning against a terrorist or security related attack. The reality 
is that government or police agencies are seldom able to deliver early warning of 
any specific value for the protection of business facilities (Hayes & Truscott, 
2004, p. 37}. 
59 
Applying the levels of communication, proposed by Quirke (1996, p. 26) to 
corporate security awareness, in order to be successful, people need firstly to 
have a sense of belonging to the company and a sense of pride in what the 
business does. They need to be informed about its activities and clear about its 
direction. There needs to be trust in management and confidence in leadership. 
To create a security culture in this environment, the company's people; 
1. Need to understand the overall security vision, mission and direction; 
2. Need to feel part of the security solution and understand their 
responsi bi I iti es; 
3. Need to know the company's security objectives and how they relate to 
them; 
4. Need to understand, be clear about and get feedback on security issues 
and incidents; and 
5. Need to understand and get feedback on their own security behaviour. 
Figure 2; Levels of security communication 
Security Mission & Direction 
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"Credibility is a strategic resource. It takes a long time to build, and an 
extraordinary short time to lose (Quirke, 1996, p. 1 00)." Like crisis 
communication, there is growing sensitivity to the impact a security incident can 
have on a business, and security communication will need to be a discipline 
enforced to protect the credibility of the company and its brands. Corporate 
reputation may withstand a very small degree of damage from time to time, but 
damage greater than that can be extremely costly to company stakeholders 
(Walter, 2000, p. 33). 
The role of security communication is not primarily the 'top-down' dissemination 
of management thinking, but the 'bottom-up' means of connecting those who are 
security aware and who know what needs to be improved, to those who have the 
authority to make changes happen. 
Communicating the company's quality characteristics in the form of corporate 
governance disclosure can lead to a competitive advantage and be attractive to 
shareholders: A company implementing comprehensive security policies and 
developing a sound security culture to protect itself and its long term interests in 
the wake of terrorism and corporate threats, communicates to stakeholders that 
the board has seriously considered the potential threats of the international 
security environment and the potential impact on the company. In response the 
board has enhanced its security culture, and accepts its continued responsibility 
to the company's strategic security in its corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Study 
Study Procedure 
This study aimed to determine the degree of recognition and application of the 
security risk management function to corporate governance practices in 
Australia. Formal research design used descriptive research methodology, 
consisting of a literature review, primary document analysis and a questionnaire 
survey to collect data. This research was contrasted to a formulated Corporate 
Governance Security Model to determine if the model is applicable to the 
recognition, or application, of security to the ASX Corporate Governance 
principles. 
The procedure for the study consisted of the following 6 stages; 
1. Development and Pilot Study; 
2. Literature Review, Document examination and data collection; 
3. Respondent contact and questionnaire completion; 
4. Data Analysis and statistical calculations; 
5. Comparative review of Model; and 
6. Recommendations and Conclusions. 
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Design 
The literature review involved a comparative study of company theory, director 
duties and responsibilities, corporate governance and security management 
literature and practices. This defined corporate governance, identified how 
effective corporate governance is achieved and its ability to create value and 
competitive advantage. The review examined the roles of the board, corporate 
governance practices, security risk management in corporate governance, case 
studies and an analysis of applications of security in treating significant business 
risks and emerging security risks. 
Document analysis and subsequent data collection consisted of locating 
disclosure of the subject's security function and its relationship with the subject's 
corporate governance practices. Corporate governance disclosures by the target 
population were accessed with subjects having websites where their documents 
were readily available. 
The analysis involved identifying the subject's current corporate governance 
framework from public documents released in the form of Annual Reports, 
Corporate Governance Statements, Policy and Principle Statements. These 
publications were reviewed to determine what risks they highlighted as forming 
part of their internal controls, risk management and corporate governance. 
Primarily, the major areas selected for further analysis were environmental 
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policy, health and safety policy,· risk management policy, asset protection, 
reporting policy and security policy. 
A questionnaire survey of the target population was designed to determine the 
company's recognition of security in its corporate governance practices. A 
website was designed and posted online to explain the purpose and significance 
of the study and allow respondents to complete a questionnaire on line. 
Respondent companies were emailed and telephoned to request their 
participation and invited to visit the research website. Respondents then 
completed the questionnaire on-line and responses were automatically emailed 
direct to the researcher. Responses were then transferred to a spreadsheet to 
accommodate the data analysis. 
A corporate governance model was formulated to identify security's risk 
management role in each of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles (2003). 
This provided a subjective outline of where security may be recognised and 
where it has an applied function within the corporate governance framework. The 
model endeavors to provide a framework and allow a comparison to be made 
between how security risk management can be applied, and how security risk 
management is currently applied. 
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Samples and Subject Selection 
In 1994 there were approximately 1100 companies listed on the ASX (Bosch, 
1995, p. 3), and this had grown to 1500 in 2004 (Dobbie, 2004, p. 25). Most of 
the companies are small, yet, as Bosch (1995, p. 3) asserts "the economic 
importance of the top 200, the size of the capital invested in them, the numbers 
of people they employ, the general familiarity with their products and services, 
and such is the fear of the damage they could do that, to most people, they 
characterize modern capitalism." 
Applying this assertion to this study, randomly selecting 60 of the ASX/S&P 200 
companies provides a sound indication of corporate security management 
following the emergence of the 'War on Terror' and the companies most likely to 
be either targeted, or affected, by any terrorist attack on critical infrastructure in 
Australia. 
The target population was therefore the top 200 publicly listed companies on the 
ASX All Ordinaries Index. This allowed for a population frame and restricted the 
study to medium to large organisations. Random selection of 60 companies listed 
on the ASX/S&P 200 as of 1 May 2004 formed a subset population, representing 
a 30 per cent sample size. 
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Of the sixty companies selected, respondents to a questionnaire were sought by 
stratified random sampling (Sekaran, 1992, p. 231) by identifying non executive 
directors and executive managers who were members of an audit, or appointed, 
committee which related to corporate governance. The selected respondent's 
email was sought from the company's website, annual report or direct inquiry to 
the company. 
Document analysis 
Data collection procedures from document analysis involved the examination of 
company websites and their compliance to corporate governance guidelines in 
the form of disclosures in their Annual Report, Corporate Governance 
Statements, Policy Statements, and Statements of Principles. The company's 
corporate governance statements were analysed to identify any recognition or 
application of a security risk management function. 
Data from document analysis was used to determine the company's core 
business an<:! activities (sector), medium and long term strategies, corporate 
policies, and corporate governance practices. This data determined the 
company's exposure and involvement to security related issues and the current 
security environment. 
Data collection recorded if the company had an audit committee and a risk 
management committee. Within the corporate governance statement and the 
disclosed role of the audit and risk management committees, it was recorded if 
the company recognised environmental risks, occupational health and safety 
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risks, asset protection policy, an incident reporting policy, and any other specific 
security function. 
Statistical calculations were performed within the response's spreadsheet which 
determined the percentage of the target population complying with corporate 
governance guidelines and the recognition of a variety of risks, including security 
risks. Sixty medium to large public companies were randomly selected from the 
sample size of two hundred, and their company announcements and reports 
were analysed. 
Statistical calculations were finalised to determine the frequency and degree to 
which security is applied and how it was integrated to enhance the company's 
current corporate governance practices. If the Corporate Governance Security 
Model is an appropriate concept, the data should support and justify the research 
questions. 
Research instruments 
Questionnaire 
The aim of the questionnaire was to determine security's current function in 
corporate governance and if the changing security environment is encouraging 
its application in the field of risk management. 
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Questionnaires, unlike psychological· -tests and inventories, have a very limited 
purpose. They are often one-shot data gathering devices with a very short life, 
administered to a limited population (Best, 1981, p. 179). 
A generic email was created to communicate the study's significance and 
proposed role of security in enhancing corporate governance. In the email 
respondents were directed to the research website to complete the questionnaire 
on-line in the form of structured questions. 
Targeted sampling was used where the respondents were selected based on 
selection criteria set out below. The use of email communication allowed for a 
greater sampling size to be obtained but reduced the number of responses due 
to company email policies and a lack of direct communication with the 
researcher. The number of respondents completing the questionnaire has 
provided a very limited view of board level security management practices. 
The correct sample size depends upon the purpose of the study and the nature 
of the population under scrutiny. A sample size of thirty is held by many to be the 
minimum number of cases if there are plans to use some form of statistical 
analysis of the data (Cohen & Manion, 1980, p. 77). This study targeted sixty 
respondents. 
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The questionnaire consisted of a closed form type. Closed form calls for short, 
check responses (Best, 1981, p. 169). Responses were either yes, no, not known 
or decline to answer. 
Consideration to the characteristics of a good questionnaire included that it; 
rbJ Deals with a specific topic which will be recognised as important enough to 
warrant the respondents time in completing; 
rbJ Seeks information which can not be obtained from other sources; 
rbJ Short as possible; 
rbJ Attractive in appearance; 
rbJ Directions are clear and complete with all terms defined and questions 
worded simply; 
rbJ Questions are objective with no leading questions; 
rbJ Questions are presented in proper psychological order, proceeding from 
general to more specific responses; and 
rbJ It is easy to tabulate and interpret. 
(Best, 1981, p. '176) 
Questionnaire data was analysed to determine the respondent's; 
• recognition of an existing security function in corporate governance; 
• recognition of security management qualifications or experience; 
• response to changes in security environment; and 
• acknowledgment of a security function in corporate governance practices. 
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Corporate Governance Security Model 
In conducting data analysis, the objective was to measure the frequency and 
degree in which the Corporate Governance Security Model, as attached at 
Annexure 3, would be expected to enhance a company's corporate governance 
and risk management practices. 
Applying the data collected to the developed model, the degree and frequency of 
contribution security risk management can make, was compared to the 
applications security has or would be expected to have in the company's 
corporate governance practices. 
The frequency and degree of security management applications in corporate 
governance will provide support to the research questions, and an indication as 
to whether the security model can be effectively applied and then enhance 
corporate governance practices. 
Pilot Study 
The generic email, as attached at Annexure 1, was sent to three independent 
people who matched the criteria as being involved in executive company 
management. The email directed the pilot respondents to the questionnaire for 
participation, as attached at Annexure 2. 
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The three pil{espondents completed the questionnaire without difficulty and did 
not raise any issue with the process or question structure. One suggested 
significantly expanding the questionnaire and to include a Likert scale, however 
adopting the suggestion would have been outside the scope and capability of the 
study. 
The pilot study identified the subjective nature of the research and the likely 
impact of respondent positions as senior company executives and board 
directors. These included restricted time commitments, scope of other issues 
they must contend with, and the general perception that they do not imminently 
face significant security related risks. 
Ethical Considerations 
The target population in this study is publicly listed companies on the Australian 
Stock Exchange. The participants in the questionnaire were representatives of 
the company, an~ therefore the study involved human participation. 
Ethical considerations of peoples consent and confidentiality was properly 
considered and protected in accordance with ECU Policies and Procedures in 
the conduct of ethical research involving human subjects (ECU Policies and 
Procedures, 2005). 
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LimitatioC 
This study t:t_a,d a number of limitations arising from the research design. The 
most significant limitation identified prior to the study was to overcome a foreseen 
lack of company director participation and to communicate the significance of the 
study. 
The major limitation was promoting the study to a level which demanded 
participation, such as seen in existing studies such as the Computer Crime and 
Security Swvey, conducted annually. This study was titled the 'National 
Corporate Governance and Security Survey and listed on an ECU Website to 
raise the profile of the study. This had little perceived impact on increasing 
responses. This resulted in a limited acknowledgement and participation by the 
sample population. 
A low response of only ten per cent was received to the questionnaire. The initial 
target company, representatives sought to participate were Company Directors. 
During the study's proposal Company Directors were identified as a potential 
limitation. As foreseen, Company Directors were very difficult to communicate 
with directly, either by phone or email. Some responses declined to participate 
stating that their directors were simply too busy. 
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It may be su~gejted that public companies either did not find the study significant 
enough, have ~ generic, yet convenient, policy of not disclosing or discussing 
their security, do not regard security as an important issue or are reluctant in 
giving security any recognition at the board level of the company. 
Limitations also exist with the accuracy of the responses. As the study proceeded 
with little response, a second round of approaches was made to the target 
population which sought company representatives at the senior management 
level responsible for either security or corporate services. This level of 
management may be unaware of what their board's responsibilities are and may 
have made assumptions concerning questionnaire responses. 
While the characteristic of these limitations may impact on a study of this kind, 
particularly in drawing questionnaire responses, it is suggested that they have 
been further exasperated by a poor recognition of security within the current 
corporate governance framework. 
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Chapter 4 
Study Results 
This chapter introduces the data collected from the document analysis and the 
questionnaire responses. Statistical calculations are presented in graphical 
format to allow immediate and clear assessment of their relevance to the 
research questions. 
Document Analysis Results 
The sixty companies randomly selected from the ASX 200 represented a broad 
range of private sectors, as per Annexure 4. Nineteen (19) different private 
sectors are represented. The two sectors with the greatest representation are 
Materials (31%) and Energy (10%). 
Table 1 presents the document types examined. A majority of public companies 
selected had annual reports and corporate governance statements accessible 
from their website. Only one subject in the population did not provide documents 
online and one provided a Statement of Principles. Table 2 and Figure 3 present 
a break down of the different sectors represented in the target population. 
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Table 1. Document Types examined-
Document Type 
Annual 'ports 27 
CorpOrate Governance Statements 31 
Statement of Principles 1 
No online information 1 
TOTAL 60 
Table 2. Sector Profile of Target Population 
Sector Profile 
No. Percentage 
Banks 2 3.33% 
Capital Goods 1 1.66% 
Commercial Services & Supplies 1 1.66% 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 1 1.66% 
Diversified Financials 2 3.33% 
Energy 6 10.00% 
Financials Ex Property 1 1.66% 
Food & Drug Retailing 3 5.00% 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 3 5.00% 
Health Care Equipment & Services 3 5.00% 
Hotels Restaurants & Leisure 2 3.33% 
Insurance 1 1.66% 
Materials 19 31.66% 
Media 4 6.66% 
Real Estate 1 1.66% 
Retailing 1 1.66% 
Telecommunication Services 1 1.66% 
Transportation 6 10.00% 
Utilities 2 3.33% 
TOTAL - 60 100% 
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Figure 3. Sector Profile of Target Population 
Statistical Calculations from Document Analysis 
Audit and Risk Management Committees 
Only one company in the target population was found not to disclose the 
existence of an audit committee on their website, otherwise all companies in the 
target population had an audit committee. Only 37 per cent of the target 
population disclosed having a risk management committee as depicted in Figure 
4. 
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Figure 4. Target Population's disclosure of a Risk Management Committee 
Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Risks 
More than 85 per cent of the target population disclosed corporate governance 
practices relating to their environmental risks and occupational healti1 and safety 
risks. Disclosure varied between detailed policy and practices statements to 
thorough to generic commentary in annual reports. 
This demonstrates that environmental and occupational health and safety is 
widely integrated with corporate governance and risk management for ASX listed 
companies. Demonstrating and publishing such compliance in corporate 
disclosures may be seen as adding value to the company's reputation . 
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Figure 5. Percentage of corporate governance policies concerning environmental 
risk. 
Figure 6. Percentage of corporate governance policies concerning occupational 
health and safety risk. 
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Asset Protection and Security Risks 
Less than 30 per cent of the target population disclosed corporate governance 
practices relating to their asset protection or security related risks. Many security 
related disclosures which were made were found to lack any substance, with only 
two companies in critical industry sectors (Telecommunications and Transport) 
having detailed security policies integrated into their corporate governance 
framework. 
These findings indicate that there is a significant lack of recognition in relation to 
security risk management and asset protection policies. Compliance in the 
functions of security and asset protection is not mandatory and therefore may be 
given less attention as a result, particularly when compared with environmental 
and occupational health and safety legislation, and therefore compliance 
requirements in these areas. There may be substantial scope for the Corporate 
Governance Security Model to contribute to corporate security risk management 
in the form of a guidance note or regulatory recommendation for compliance. 
Figure 7. Percentage of corporate governance policies concerning asset 
protection. 
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Figure 8. Percentage of corporate governance policies concerning a security 
function. 
Reporting Policy 
Less than 40 per cent of the target population disclosed corporate governance 
practices relating to any reporting policy. Many reported disclosures were only 
briefly noted under occupational health and safety policies. 
Figure 9. Percentage of corporate governance policies concerning reporting 
policy. 
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Questionnaire results 
Due to the poor response (1 0 per cent) to the approach email, as attached at 
Annexure 1 and the questionnaire, as attached at Annexure 2, the sector profile 
is extremely limited ajcan only provide an individual response to represent an 
entire sector. Subsequently the sector profile of the questionnaire respondents 
contributed little value to the study. 
Table 3. Sector Profile of Target Population completing questionnaire 
Sector Profile 
No. Percentage 
Materials 3 ·50% 
Health Care Equipment & Services 1 16.66% 
Media 1 16.66% 
Food & Drug Retailing 1 16.66% 
TOTAL 6 100% 
Statistical Calculations from Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of 19 questions which sought responses to 
determine the following; 
Part 1 
Part 2 
Part 3 
Part 4 
Recognition of an existing security function in Corporate Governance; 
Recognition of security management qualifications or experience; 
Response to changes in security environment; and 
Acknowledgment of applied security functions in corporate governance 
practices 
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Part one of the questionnaire sought to determine the current recognition of the 
security function by the board of directors in the corporate governance 
framework. Only a third of respondents documented security functions as a 
:s::n~::~::.sibilityjalf documented security functions as an audit committee 
All respondents included security management in its review of internal controls. 
Half stated they integrated security policy with corporate governance policy. A 
majority of the respondents had a policy promoting a security culture. Table 4 
outlines responses to Part 1. This demonstrates that security functions are 
recognised by respondents but security is not isolated in policy statements and 
risk management practices. Implementing the corporate governance security 
model would provide guidance to companies recognise their existing security 
functions allow for security policy formulation. 
Table 4. Responses to Questionnaire Part 1. 
Part 1 Current recognition of the security function 
Security Security Security in Integrate Policy 
documented as documented review of security policy promoting a 
Respondent a board as an audit internal with corporate security 
responsibility? committee controls? governance culture? 
responsibility? policy? 
Materials No No Yes No No 
Materials No No Yes No Not known 
Materials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Food & Drug No Yes Yes No Yes 
Retailing 
Media Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Health Equipment & No No Yes Yes Yes 
Services 
(, 
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Part 2 of the questionnaire sought to determine the recognition of security 
management qualifications and experience on the Board of Directors. No 
respondent company had a member of the board with any qualifications or 
experience in security management. Only a third of respondents had a member 
of the board or committee with designated responsibility for the security function. 
Five of the six respondents )ad sought external security advice in the previous 
two years, all respondents considered that corporate security advice was 
available and a majority stated they would consider obtaining independent 
security advice, with one respondent answering not known. Table 5 outlines 
responses to Part 2. These results provide that companies are willing to seek out 
and listen to security related advice, giving credence to a potential need for a 
model by which security can be consistently implemented into corporate 
governance practices. 
Table 5. Responses to Questionnaire Part 2. 
Part 2 Recognition of security management qualifications and experience on the Board of 
Directors 
Respondent Board or senior 
executive has 
qualifications or 
demonstrated 
experience in 
security 
management? 
Materials Not known 
Materials No 
Materials No 
Food & Drug No 
Retailing 
Media No 
Health No 
Equipment & 
Services 
Board or an 
appointed 
committee has 
designated 
responsibility for 
security 
management? 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Board or an 
appointed 
committee 
sought external 
advice regarding 
a security 
related issue 
within the last 2 
years? 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Considers that 
corporate 
security advice 
is available? 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Considers 
obtaining 
independent 
security advice? 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Not known 
~/ 
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Part 3 of the questionnaire sought to determine a response to perceived changes 
in the security environment. A majority of respondents had recognised changes 
in the security environment over the last five years which have increased their 
business risks. Half considered that the current security environment presents 
significant business risks to the company. Only a third had reviewed security 
policy or audited security procedures in the previous two years, although two 
thirds had informed their board or appointed committee of an internal security 
event or incident in the previous 12 months. Table 6 outlines responses to Part 3. 
The interest of directors and board committees in security related internal 
controls provides an opportunity for the Corporate Governance Security Model to 
provide a mechanism by which security is nominated as an agenda item which is 
regularly reviewed and discussed at the board level. 
Table 6. Responses to Questionnaire Part 3. 
Part 3 Response to changes in security environment 
Respondent Recognised Consider that Board or an Board or an Board or an 
changes in the the current appointed appointed appointed 
security security commitlee commitlee committee been 
environment environment reviewed audited security informed of an 
which have presents security policy procedure within internal security 
increased your significant within the last 2 the last 2 years? event or incident 
business risk business risks to years? in the last 12 
within the last 5 your company? months? 
years? 
Materials No No No No No 
Materials Not known No No No No 
Materials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Food & Drug Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retailing 
Media Yes No No No Yes 
Health Yes Yes No No Yes 
Equipment & 
Services 
84 
Part 4 of the questionnaire sought to determine if a security function would be 
acknowledged if applied to corporate governance practices. A majority of 
respondents regarded good security practices to form part of good corporate 
governance and would consider that corporate governance is, or would be 
enhanced by the application of a security function. Only a third of respondents 
considered that the application of a security function to corporate governance 
would contribute to long term revenue enhancement of the company. A majority 
considered that company stakeholders would favour disclosure of a security 
function within corporate governance disclosures. Table 7 outlines responses to 
Part 4. 
Table 7. Responses to Questionnaire Part 4. 
Part 4 Acknowledgment of applied security functions in corporate. governance 
practices 
Respondent 
Materials 
Materials 
Materials 
Food & Drug 
Retailing 
Media 
Health 
Equipment & 
Services 
Regard good 
security practices as 
part of good 
corporate 
governance? 
Not known 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Consider that 
corporate 
governance is, or 
would be, enhanced 
by the application of 
a security function? 
Not known 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Consider that an 
application of a 
security function to 
corporate 
governance 
contributes to long 
term revenue 
enhancement? 
Not known 
No 
Decline to 
answer 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Consider that 
company 
stakeholders would 
favour disclosure of 
a security function 
within corporate 
governance 
disclosures? 
Not known 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Chapter 5 
Data Analysis and interpretations 
Analysis of the study results was conducted to determine any common themes or 
interpretations in the recognition and awareness of security risk management in 
corporate governance practices in the target population. 
The analysis of the percentage calculations from the 60 companies randomly 
selected from the ASX 200 and their disclosed corporate governance statements 
strongly suggest that security related risks are not widely recognised or 
considered as part of the corporate governance framework. 
Therefore, in answer to research question one, the Corporate Governance 
Security Model does not recognise an existing security function in current 
corporate governance practices. 
85 per cent of companies disclosed environmental and occupational health and 
safety risks which are given due attention and are well documented in annual 
reports and corporate governance statements. However only 28 per cent 
documented any asset protection or security related responsibilities. This 
included analysis of risk management committee c)Jarters, in which security risks 
were often not raised as part of the risk manage~ent context. Only 38 per cent 
documented any reporting policy suggesting many companies do not have 
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procedures in place concerning the -reporting, recording and analysis of security 
related incidents. Companies are therefore unlikely to be aware of the real cost of 
security, the return on investment they receive from security spending, and 
trends which may be leading to inherent, but preventable losses. 
Analysis of questionnaire results identified that a majority of company boards do 
not have a documented responsibility for a security function and directors are 
unlikely to have any demonstrated experience or qualifications in security 
management. Questionnaire respondents indicated that security was reviewed 
as part of internal controls and that security was integrated into corporate 
governance policy. 
Comparison of the respondents' questionnaire results and document analysis 
suggests that although companies may have a security function operating, it is 
not disclosed in corporate governance statements or other publications. There is 
limited substance to the claim that companies consider the existence of internal 
security controls confidential. Company stakeholders have an interest in knowing 
that the company they associate with recognises and is managing their security 
responsibilities and risks. 
( 
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Application of data analysis to Corp-orate Governance Security Model 
Currently, a majority of Boards in Australian public companies have not 
documented their responsibility or recognition of security risk management within 
their governance framework. This is in contrast to the model which proposes that 
security functions be incorporated as a responsibility of the board under Principle 
1 and included in the Board's charter. 
A majority of questionnaire respondents cited independent security advice to be 
available and utilised by company boards. This is consistent with the model in 
Principle 2, recommending Boards' add value by having procedures in place to 
take independent professional advice if necessary. The model proposes the 
board recognise security management as a profession and seek information and 
specialist advice on security issues when necessary. 
With limited application of security risk management in the corporate governance 
framework, there "is less focus on security related behaviour within the codes of 
conduct held by a majority of public companies. Although a majority of 
questionnaire respondents indicated they incorporated a policy promoting a 
security culture, there was no evidence found in the company's public documents 
advising stakeholders. The model at Principle 3 and Principle 10 proposes the 
implementation of security awareness within the Code of Conduct to highlight the 
responsibility on all company officers and employees to promote awareness and ( 
~' 
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recognition of protecting company assets and mitigating loss from security 
related breaches. 
All respondents included security functions in its review of internal controls and 
this is consistent with supporting literature research. Audit committees and risk 
management committee's are certainly inclined to examine obvious areas of risk 
to company assets and trends or incidents of loss. However, security spending is 
often viewed as a cost centre, therefore receiving limited attention in comparison 
to examining business units for legislated compliance requirements and proactive 
profit generation. The model, at Principle 4, proposes that security compliance is 
audited and recognised as a long term revenue enhancer. Examining security 
with cost and benefit analysis provides opportunity in providing a balanced 
security plan which makes best use of people, technology and management to 
address significant risks. 
Less than 30 per cent of the target population reported reference to security 
management in their corporate disclosures to company stakeholders, particularly 
shareholders. The model considers and implements security communications to 
company stakeholders in PrincipleS and Principle 6, informing shareholders and 
potential investors that the company recognises its responsibilities in maintaining 
a secure and sustainable operating environment. 
Management of significant business risks should include secur~y ri$k in any 
. / 
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holistic risk management plan for a public company. The model implements 
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security risk management at Principle 7 to ensure security is a component of 
recognising and managing business risk and ensuring internal control and 
compliance systems relate to security, alongside other significant risks. 
No respondent company had a member of the board with any qualifications or 
experience in security management. Only a third of respondents had a member 
of the board or committee with designated responsibility for the security function. 
The model implements security induction and awareness information to existing 
or new directors and executive management under Principle 8 of encouraging 
enhanced performance. This supports security recognition and practice within the 
board and corporate culture. 
This study demonstrates that the Corporate Governance Security Model has the 
potential to enhance current corporate governance practices. The model 
implements security to the corporate governance framework to formally 
recognise and promote effective management of security risk and compliance. 
Applying security risk management, as an applied business process supports 
and enhances the corporate reputation and compliments other risk and business 
management practices. Security of information and confidentiality is enhanced to 
encourage reports of misconduct within the company, generating a strong and 
inherent security culture. 
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Chapter 6 
Study outcomes and recommendations 
This chapter presents the outcomes and recommendations of the study which set 
out to determine if the Corporate Governance Security Model recognises an 
existing security function in current governance practices and if the model would 
enhance the governance framework. 
Research Conclusions 
A major finding of this study is that security functions and re.sponsibilities are 
poorly recognised and documented by Australia's largest public company boards. 
Many directors will have no experience or qualifications in security management 
and this is likely to be reflected down through the organisation resulting in low to 
medium security awareness and culture. 
Security functions are being limited to form part of internal controls within the 
operating environment and generally viewed as a cost centre which does not 
contribute to revenue. Security functions are not being holistically applied across 
the organisation or within the corporate governance or risk management 
framework. 
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Applying the survey results to the target population, namely ASX/S&P 200 
companies, security is not recognised as a board responsibility. This should be 
disturbing to investors and the wider community as the current security 
environment presents significant risks, particularly with the backdrop of sustained 
terrorism and e-commerce threats. The literature review found that in most 
cases, in the event of a terrorist or major security event, the business community 
will not be knowledgeable about the roles, responsibilities or interactions of public 
health, safety, emergency and security agencies. 
Corporate security threats to Australia's largest 200 companies can come from 
radical international organisations, domestic extremist groups, organised crime 
networks, competitors, company officers and employees. Companies must plan 
for a variety of attacks and events, and understand the governmental and risk 
management framework in place to respond to each event. Other responses 
include addressing personnel behaviour, health and safety, emotional distress 
and a plethora of business continuation issues (Business Executives, 2004). 
If security risk management is not being formally recognised as a Board 
responsibility, investors should be asking Directors if these significant risks are 
being managed and addressed. If a company does recognise its security 
responsibilities and has policy in place, investors should be informed under 
current corporate governance guidelines, namely Principle 6. This enables the 
company's reputation and market position to be enhanced by communicating to 
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stakeholders that the company has- considered its security for long term 
sustai nabi I ity. 
The application of the Corporate Governance Security Model was found to be a 
consistent and realistic guide for companies to formally introduce and apply 
security functions to corporate governance practices. The literature review found 
that the message from the top down must be that the company wants to develop 
and maintain a security culture. If the message is that the company recognises 
its need to develop security functions, security behaviour and a general security 
environment, and if the message is serious and sincere, then those things 
themselves become the focus for the conduct of organisational matters. 
Most employees currently don't consider their security responsibility and have the 
mentality that security is someone else's problem, not theirs (Fitzgerald, 2004). 
This reflects a poor security culture in Australian business communities. Poor 
culture provides unnecessary vulnerability to company activities in the form of 
preventable security breaches and the inability to identify loss or incident trends, 
potentially exposing the company to significant liability. This is reiterated in the 
study's finding that there is a low application and documentation of formal 
security conduct and reporting systems within current governance frameworks. 
I 
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Research recommendations 
The results of !~study were reasonably restricted to allow a number of 
conclusive results, however there are generally inconclusive results. There are a 
number of recommendations resulting from the study and are primarily 
concerned with the continued need for research into the application and 
recognition of security risk management within the hierarchy of executive and 
business management. 
The first recommendation is for a similarly structured study to be conducted but 
with far greater support and recognition within the corporate sector to capture a 
substantive measure of the application and recognition . of security risk 
management within the corporate governance framework. This would provide the 
Australian investment 'community with a real insight in~o the security and risk 
management standing and capability of Australia's largest companies to respond 
to current security risks and threats, in particular terrorism and information 
warfare. 
A second recommendation involves a far greater assessment and analysis of the 
Corporate Governance Security Model and its application to corporate 
governance practices. The benefits of greater application of security awareness 
and recognition in corporate governance have remained relatively unmeasured 
and would require a longitudinal study or predictive research. It is envisaged that 
such a study would be inherently complex, involving an accurate assessment of 
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attitudes towards the security discipline as a corporate profession and necessity, 
and if this may vary over time. 
It is recomr:nended that aspects of this research be applied to current longitudinal 
studies which relate to security. The Australian Computer Crime and Security 
Survey, commenced in 2002, is conducted annually and addresses computer 
security management, vulnerabilities, threats and challenges. New longitudinal 
research in line with this study may be added to this survey to measure an 
increase in security recognition and security risk management in corporate 
governance practices. 
Further research is strongly recommended in areas of corporate security culture, 
security awareness tr~ining and security risk communications. The poor 
recognition of security within corporate governance may be resultant from the 
inability of security managers to justify security as a long term revenue enhancer 
and they may be reinforcing the view that security is a cost centre which requires 
restrictive control. -
With enhanced security risk communications and better security awareness 
training, security cultures can be developed to allow the benefits of reduced 
security incidents and company sustainability to be realised. Significantly 
improving an organisation's security culture may have a positive impact on 
improving corporate ethics and conduct, meaning security can have a far greater 
strategic and holistic benefit than is currently understood. 
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Finally, continued exploratory research is required into security risk management 
design, application and treatment options to introduce benchmark guidelines, 
such as in Australian Standards, in security management for corporate Australia. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
J'~is study is based upon its implications to corporate governance and security 
risk management practices in Australia and overseas. The study researched 
security's application to the corporate governance and risk management 
framework, and created a model with which it can be implemented. The model 
endeavors to provide new approaches and guidance to current corporate 
governance policy, and promote security management as a valued business 
practice at the executive management and board level. 
This research supports security risk management as a viable and necessary 
business framework that can contribute to core business and profit generation, 
however the study determined that the security function is poorly recognised in 
current corporate governance frameworks. If holistically applied, the Corporate 
Governance Security Model is likely to contribute to promoting best practice 
security management and supports security functions as a necessary contributor 
in corporate assessment, particularly risk management, auditing and business 
continuity. 
Security functions in corporate governance can first be enhanced by the 
disclosure of its role and documented responsibility for the board of director's to 
apply strategic security direction for day-to-day management and internal . 
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controls.) The review of security practices, which have remained, unchanged or 
unchallenged may lead to better practices that maximise corporate value. At 
worst, an 9formed confidence is provided to the board and management about 
existing security management issues and trends. 
Senior management experience is likely to become an important qualification as 
the role of security continues to emerge in corporate significance. Currently, 
security functions are mostly accommodated in mid-level management positions. 
The highest levels of the organisation, the Board of Directors and its operating 
committees must be provided with the strategy, costs and related impacts of the 
security function, and the nature and probability of catastrophic and significant 
security risk events. This allows greater compliance with ·current corporate 
governance principles and an informed investment community. 
The application of security risk management to corporate governance should 
involve the board or designated committee formulating the security policy of the 
organisation and 'developing an appropriate security culture and awareness 
regime. Strategic security planning should be in line with corporate direction and 
key resources, directing the board and executive management in protecting all 
asset types, mitigating loss and providing accountability for corporate 
governance. 
Strong holistic security controls which are reported regularly to the board, and 
audit and risk management committees should enable alert watch-keeping of 
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director, management :2 employee behaviour, critical infrastructure and asset 
protection strategies, operational security and loss mitigation, and monitoring of 
external threats and risks, all which can cause severe stress on short and long 
term financial performance. 
Articulating and championing the business case for security management must 
be seen as an essential part of the role played by any corporate security director. 
This may be more difficult if security communications are insufficient and not 
directly reporting to top management or integrated into corporate practices and 
culture. However as security research continues and security management 
becomes more integrated into strategic management, this should improve. 
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Annexure 1 
/j Letter of Approach for questionnaire 
SUBJECT: National Corporate Governance & Security Study 
Your assistance is sought in a national research project to identify the role of security in 
corporate governance. The study forms part of a security science thesis for Edith Cowan 
University, Perth. A verification letter for this research is available from ECU upon 
request. As you may appreciate conducting security related research is difficult due to 
potential sensitivities. Any assistance you are able to provide would be greatly 
appreciated. 
The significance of this study is based upon its implications to current corporate 
governance and security management practices in Australia and overseas. Should the 
study confirm security's enhancement of the corporate governance framework, and a 
model with which it can be implemented, it will provide new approaches to current 
corporate goveniance policy, and promote security as a valued business practice at 
executive management and board level. 
The research involves the application of a security model for corporate governance practices 
and seeks your responses to a questionnaire. The questionnaire aims to identify a security 
function in your corporate governance practices and consists of only 19 questions. Areas for 
consideration are; 
1. Recognition of an existing security function in corporate governance; 
2. Recognition of security management qualifications or experience; 
3. Response to changes in the security environment; and 
4. Acknowledgment of applied security functions in corporate governance practices. 
You represent a listed company on the Australian Stock Exchange and in the 
S&P/ASX200 as of 1 May 2004. Your responses will significantly benefit the study and 
will be kept anonymous within the thesis. If you wish to clarify any issue or discuss this 
research further, please do not hesitate to contact Chris directly on 0432 743 261. 
To participate in the survey, please visit http://www.soem.ecu.edu.au/-ccubbage/ 
Sincerely, 
Chris Cubbage 
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Annexure 2 
National Survey of Security in Corporate Governance 
Introduction 
Your participation in this study will contribute to the research of corporate 
governance, security and risk management in Australian business. The aim of 
this questionnaire is to determine the application of a security function in your 
corporate governance practices. 
You represent a listed company on the Australian Stock Exchange ('ASX') and 
within the S&P/ASX200 as of 1 May 2004. The target is to achieve 30%, equaling 
60 respondents. 
Your information is valued and will be kept anonymous within the thesis. Some 
companies may be discussed as a case study, however only publicly available 
information will be used. 
Thank you. 
Start Questionnaire Purpose of the study 
Significance of the study 
110 
Purpose of the study 
Thematic research priorities for the protection of the built environment, including 
critical infrastructure, proposed by Yates (2004, p. 1 0), state that challenges 
related to business awareness of the changed security environment and risk 
management include; 
g) A failure to integrate security considerations into governance frameworks; 
h) Lack of business awareness that sound business risk management, 
security and resilience can be a long term revenue enhancer; 
i) Lack of benchmarks and metrics for effective security investment; 
j) Lack of integration of security into the issues of consideration for all 
professionals and managers; 
k) Lack of risk management and security risk experience in business; and 
I) Lack of modeling tools and validation models. 
This study is in line with Yates' research priorities by proposing research into 
security's application to essential corporate governance principles recommended 
by the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003). By demonstrating that 
security enhances corporate governance, it supports security as a viable and 
necessary business framework that can contribute to core business and profit 
generation. The development of a security model for corporate governance 
promotes best practice security management and supports security as a 
contributor in areas such as corporate assessment, particularly risk 
management, auditing and business continuity. 
Start Questionnaire 
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Significance of the study 
This study is significant and well timed as corporate governance and security are 
two of the major issues concerning the corporate world today. The two issues are 
brought together in this study. 
The significance of this study is based upon its implications to current corporate 
governance and security management practices in Australia and overseas. 
Should the study confirm security's enhancement of the corporate governance 
framework, and a model with which it can be implemented, it will provide new 
approaches to current corporate governance policy, and promote security as a 
valued business practice at executive management and board level. 
The study will also generate more interest in security management research and 
education, particularly in its application to business leadership and executive 
management. This will contribute to the continued growth of the security 
profession. 
Start Questionnaire 
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Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by selecting from the drop down menu. 
Part 1 Recognition of an existing security function in 
Corporate Governance 
a) Is your organisation's security documented as a board 
responsibility? 
b) Is your organisation's security documented as an audit 
committee responsibility? 
c) Does the organisation include security in its review of internal 
controls? 
d) Does the company integrate security policy with corporate 
governance policy? 
e) Does your company have a policy promoting a security culture? 
Part 2 Recognition of security management 
qualifications or experience 
a) Does any member of the board or senior executive have 
qualifications or demonstrated experience in security 
management? 
b) Does any member of the board or an appointed committee have 
designated responsibility for security management? 
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c) Has the board or an appointed committee sought external advice 
regarding a security related issue within the last 2 years? 
d) Do you consider that corporate security advice is available? 
e) Would you consider obtaining independent security advice? 
Part 3 Response to changes in security environment 
a) Have you recognised changes in the security environment which 
have increased your business risk within the last 5 years? 
b) Do you consider that the current security environment presents 
significant business risks to your company? 
c) Has the board or an appointed committee reviewed security 
policy within the last 2 years? 
d) Has the board or an appointed committee audited security 
procedure within the last 2 years? 
e) Has the board or an appointed committee been informed of an 
internal security event or incident in the last 12 months? 
Part 4 Acknowledgment of applied security functions 
in corporate governance practices 
a) Do you regard good security practices as part of good corporate 
governance? 
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b) Do you consider that corporate governance is, or would be, 
enhanced by the application of a security function? 
c) Do you consider that an application of a security function to 
corporate governance contributes to long term revenue 
enhancement? 
d) Do you consider that company stakeholders would favour 
disclosure of a security function within corporate governance 
disclosures? 
Thank you for your time. 
A copy of the study and results will be forwarded to you upon completion. 
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Annexure 3 - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SECURITY MODEL 
Governance Principle Governance Practice Security Function Applied Outcome/Disclosure I 
Statement 
Principle 1: Formal board charter that details Security is included as a The board recognises its I 
the functions and responsibilities responsibility of the board within responsibility for security risk 
Lay solid foundations for of the board its current responsibility to review management and security 
management and oversight and ratify systems of risk compliance and control 
management and internal 
compliance and control 
Principle 2: All directors should bring an Professional security advice is The board accepts security as a 
independent judgment to bear in made available to the board and profession and seeks specialist 
Structure the board to add value decision making with procedures directors in addition to other advice on security issues when 
in place to take independent professions. necessary 
professional advice if necessary 
Principle 3: 1) Adherence to a documented 1) Adherence to security policy Security risk management is 
Code of Conduct and procedures is recognised recognised and practiced within 
Promote ethical and responsible within the Code of Conduct the board and corporate culture 
decision-making 2) Adherence to a documented 
trading policy 2) A formal response within 
security guidelines to prohibited 
trading and unethical conduct 
Principle 4: Existence of an independent Security compliance is audited Security risk management is 
audit committee; and results are reported to the maintained, monitored and 
Safeguard integrity in financial • The committee should report board reviewed by the board 
reporting to the board all matters 
relevant to the results of its Security management is 
review of risk management recognised by the board as a 
and internal compliance and long term revenue enhancer 
control systems > 
--- -- - --- --- - - ----- - ------ --· -- -- -
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Governance Principle Governance Practice Security Function Applied Outcome 
Principle 5: Continuous disclosure policies Security implications are Security related risks are 
and procedures are in place; considered by the board in managed for disclosure of 
Make timely and balanced • Internal notification and making 'sensitive' disclosures 'sensitive' information 
I disclosure decision making concerning 
the disclosure obligation 
• Safeguarding confidentiality of I 
corporate,information to avoid 
premature disclosure 
Principle 6: Publishing the company's policy Security implications or issues Shareholders are ensured that 
on shareholder communication are considered by the board in the company's electronic 
Respect the rights of will help investors to access the its communications with communications are secure and 
shareholders information; shareholders, particularly with that electronic integrity is 
Companies are encouraged to electronic communications maintained 
maintain a company website and 
communicate with shareholders 
via electronic means. 
Principle 7: The Board or appropriate board The board accepts security risk Security risk management is 
committee should establish management as a component of maintained, monitored and 
Recognise and manage risk policies on risk oversight and recognizing and managing reviewed by the board 
management. This should business risks 
include policies on oversight, risk Security management is 
profile, risk management, The board determines security recognised by the board as a 
compliance and control, and policy and internal security long term revenue enhancer 
assessment of effectiveness. compliance and control systems 
L_ __ ._ ---
-- -· -- - - -- - - -- - -- - -
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Governance Principle Governance Practice Security Function Applied Outcome 
Principle 8: An induction program should be Security induction and Security risk management is 
made available to new directors awareness information is recognised and practiced within 
Encourage enhanced to gain an understanding of the provided to new directors and the board and corporate culture 
performance company's financial, strategic, executive management 
operational and risk 
managemer:~t position; the role of 
the board committees; and their 
rights, duties and responsibilities 
Principle 9: Disclosing the remuneration Model not applied Model not applied 
policy provides a transparent and 
Remunerate fairly and readily understandable 
responsibly framework for executive 
compensation. 
Principle 10: Establish and disclose a code of Effective management of Security risk management is 
conduct to guide compliance with security risk and compliance recognised and practiced within 
Recognise the legitimate legal and other obligations to enhances the corporate the board and corporate culture 
interests of stakeholders legitimate stakeholders; reputation and compliments 
A code of conduct should enable other risk management 
employees to alert management practices; 
and the board in good faith to Security of information and 
potential misconduct without fear confidentiality is enhanced to 
of retribution, and should require encourage reports of 
recording and investigation of misconduct; 
such alerts; Security has a response 
The company should have a capacity, including investigative, 
system for ensuring compliance to deal with misconduct and 
with its code of conduct and for compliance issues. 
dealing with complaints 
--
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Annexure 4- Document analysis of ASX listed companies 
60 S&P/ASX 200 listed companies, May 1, 2004 
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ASX Code Home Page Annual Report 
AFI b!tp:!Jwww aU com au/ Annual Report 2002 
AGG hUo·IJwww angloqold cgm/ Annual Financial Statements 2003 
AGL hUp:l/wyJw ag! com auiAGLNewlde!ay!t him Annual Report 2003 
ALN hllp·IJwww alinta net ayt Annual Report 2003 
AMC h!tp·l/www amcor com/ Concise Report 2003 
ANZ h!!p·llwww anz somlde!aul! asp Coroora\e Governance Policy 
ABO hUo·llymw arcenergy com auf Corcorale Governance Statemenl 
ASX bttp·/fwww asx com au/ Comorate Governance Statemen! 
SSG hllp:ltwww billabonacoroorale.com/ Coroorate Governance S!alement 
CBA CommonweaUb Bank Groyp Coroora!e Governance 
CML h!tp·l/www co!esmyer com/ S!atement ol Pdncjp!es 
COH hnp·tt.yww cochlear com auf Comorate Governance 
CSM h!!p;f!www consmjnera!s com au/ Annya! Report 2003 
CSA hUp·/Jwww csr com au! Comorale Cioyemance Statemenl 2003 
CTX http·ffW\W{ caHex corn auf Como@le Governance Practjces 
EQ! hUp:l/yvyiw egyjgold com au/ Annual Reoort 2003 
ERA hrtp·/!vfflw enerqyres com au/ Comorafe Governance S!a!emenf 
FGL http·lfwww fosters com ay/ Annual Report 2003 
FLT hHp:IJwww f!jch!cenfre com aut lnsulficienl on line information 
FOA htto://www fa! com au/ Annual Report 2003 
HlG hllp:flwww h!gh!andspaciljc com/ Annual Report 2003 
HL Y htlp:J/www hi!lsmotorwav com aut Comorale Ggvemance Statement 
HVN bUo:l/wwvv harveynoonan cgm au/ Annual Report 2003 
lAG hltp·l/www jag corn ayf Comgrate Governance Statement 
KCN http://www k!ngsgate com au/ Annual Repgrt 2003 
KIM hllp:J/w.Nw kjmber!eydjamondco com au/ Annyal Report 2003 
LEI hUp·llwMy !ejghton cgm ayt Comorate Goyemance statement 2003 
LLC htJo:l/www !end!ease com au/ Annual Reporl2903 
LNN hUp·/fw.Jw lign-natban com! Annual Report 2002 
LSG http·l!www ljonsetection com au/ Annya! Repgrt 2003 
MAP h!tpji/WWW macguarie com au/map Comorate Governance Statement 
MAY ht1p·!lwww maynegroup com/ Annual Report 2003 
MCC hl!p:l/www macarthurcgal cgm auf Como@te Ggvemance Sta!ement 
NFD h!tp:/Jwww naligna!loods cgm ayt Cornorate Governance Statement 2003 
NUF httpi/W\ft/W nufaon cgm/ Annya! Report 2003 
NVS h!tp:llw\yw novuspetro!eum com/ Cgmorate Goyemance Statement 
ORG hHp;//www origjnenergy com au/ Corporate Governance Sfa!ement 
OR! http·lfwvyw orica cgmf Cgmorate Governance Slatemen! 
OSH hnp:!Jwww ojlsearch corn/h!mV Comorale Goyemance Statement 
OST http://www ones!eel com/ Comgrate Governance 
PBL hUp:l/www.pb! com auf Coroorate Governance 
PDG htto:lfwww placerdome com/ Comorale Governance 
PMM hltp:Jiw.Nwl pgrtman cgm au/ Comoratg Governance 
PRK hUp"//wyyw palrjck com ay/ Comoratg Ggvemance 
QAN bttp;ljwww ganJas com ay/ Comorate Goyemapce 
RIO http·lfflww riolinto comfde!ay!t aspx Annual Repgrt 2003 
SEV http://wroy seven com auf Anaya! Report 2003 
SGW hUo:lfmw.rl sog com au/ Coroorate Governance 
SHL h!to:Jiwww sonjcbeal!hcare com/sgnicljo!emeV Comomte Ggygmance 
SPT bUp:Uwvyw spo!less com ay/ Annual Report 2003 
TAB hnp/Jwww ta,b!jmi!ed com au/news asp?NC!D:::Annual Report 2003 
TEN bltp·/twww.tencomorale.corn.au/ Annual Report 2003 
TLS http:l/\elstra.com/index.jsp Comorale Governance 
TOL h!!p:/Jwww toll cgm ayf Annual Report 2003 
VBA http·//www yjminb{ue com au/ Comorale Governance 
WAN h!tp1Jwww tbewest cgm au/ Annual Report 2003 
WMR h!!o·//www wmc com/ Annual Report 2003 
WOW hl!o·flwww woo!wortbs!imited com au/ Anaya! Report 2003 
W PL hUp·/fwww wopdside com au/ Comorale Governance 
ZFX http·//wyyw zinj!ex c:grn/Majn.aspx Comorate Ggverance 
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